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“American culture is rich in the belief that an individual can pull up stakes and make a
fresh start, but a universally identified man might become a prisoner of his recorded
past.” -- U.S. Department of Health, Welfare, and Education (HEW), “Report on
Records, Computers, and the Rights of Citizens” (1973).
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Abstract
The 21st Century has been marked by increasing digital globalization, and an extensive,
complete record of most individual’s public and private lives. This posed enough of a risk
to privacy that in 2014, the European Union began to outline and articulate the digital
privacy rights of European citizens in a set of policies known as “right to be forgotten”
laws. As of 2018, these right to be forgotten protections had been codified into the
General Data Privacy Regulation for the EU (GDPR). This paper explores the
construction of privacy and subsequent adoption of the right to be forgotten specifically
in France, relative to the divergent evolution of privacy—and lack of digital privacy
protections—in the United States. Namely, this paper compares the right to be forgotten
as a potential tool of rehabilitation in conjunction with criminal expungement practices
and considers the connections between a punitive criminal justice system and digital
remembering.
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Section I: The Arrival of a New Privacy Right
In a 2010 case in the Spanish courts, a Spanish citizen filed complaints against
Google and Google Spain to remove links to a decades-old news article which referenced
a property he owned which had been foreclosed due to nonpayment. The Spanish Data
Protection Agency (AEPD) ruled in favor of the plaintiff, and that Google Spain must
delete links to the article since the information was outdated. Google appealed this
decision, and in 2014, the judicial branch of the European Union, the European Court of
Justice (CJEU), ruled again in favor of the plaintiff and his “right to be forgotten,” stating
that search engines must respond and remove information upon request, about any
information deemed “inadequate, irrelevant or no longer relevant, or excessive”
(Dowdell, 2016, p. 319). These key rulings in these cases eventually resulted in a new
EU-wide proposal being drafted, known as the General Data Protection Regulation
(GDPR). The GDPR became codified into law in 2018, replacing the 1995 Data
Protection Directive, and granted all citizens of EU member states a more narrowed
“right to erasure,” which allows citizens the right to petition data controllers and
processors for removal of information (Art. 17(2), GDPR). While the right to be forgotten
reflects advances in privacy in digital spheres to better protect individuals residing in the
EU, competing interests between internet service providers and private citizens required
drafting laws that attempt to find a balance between the public’s right to know and
privacy concerns of individuals.
The right to be forgotten is a personal data statute which allows individuals to
petition search engines for removal of certain truthful information about themselves
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online. Defined as both a “right to delete” true-but-outdated information about oneself, as
well as a “right to control information about oneself,” the right to be forgotten applies
existing privacy doctrine to emerging digital contexts. The right to be forgotten emerged
in the European Union over the past three decades from a desire to provide data
protection to citizens, and out of a centuries-long commitment to the principles of privacy
as identity formation. In the Google v. Spain case, the plaintiff argued that the continued
publication of this true-yet-outdated information was violating their privacy via the 1995
Data Protection Directive (95/46/EC), which asserts that data processing must “respect
their fundamental rights and freedoms, notably the right to privacy” (Directive 95/46/EC,
Article 2). Now called “the right to be forgotten,” “the right to delete,” or the “right to
erasure,” the basic tenets of the right to be forgotten have incorporated a more nuanced
understanding around memory in their interchangeability. As Antoon deBaets argues, the
right to be forgotten implies forcing another to forget about an individual’s past actions,
as “an act of coercion in the realm of holding and expressing opinions” (de Baets 2016,
8). Rather, the ‘right to erasure’ or its synonym, ‘the right to delete,’ both highlight the
power of the individual to remove information about themselves without coercive
language or a power willing another to forget. For the purposes of this paper, “the right to
be forgotten” will be used as the policy name in general, with occasional inclusions of
‘the right to delete or erase’ for specific mentions of removal of information.
Thus, the right to be forgotten emerged as a mechanism used to assess, process,
and potentially de-list the overwhelming amount of information available to everyone
through a few keystrokes of a Google search. Whether it is related to the latest celebrity
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drama or a decades-old story of criminal wrongdoing, the internet preserves a
comprehensive digital memory that is more accessible and more complete than what any
individual is capable of remembering (Mayer-Schönberger, 2009). However, the laws
around punishment and wrongdoing have not kept pace with this onslaught of
information; the societal and legal values of transparency over privacy have ensured that
rehabilitation after wrongdoing has not been a priority considered by current laws or
statutes.
Although the right to be forgotten has many proponents beyond the European
Union, other countries—such as Canada, Australia, and the United States—oppose the
measure. Considered by many U.S. scholars to be a blunt tool to parse the delicate
balance between the right to privacy of an individual versus the right to know of the
masses, the right to be forgotten has yet to take root in U.S. federal policy.
Simultaneously, state courts and legislative bodies have been seeking other solutions to
the growing concerns around people with records of incarceration facing barriers to reentering mainstream society. A criminal record in the age of instant recall becomes a
huge financial and social barrier to normal life.
While many U.S. states are currently pushing for laws on digital criminal
expungement to alleviate the burden on the American populace from histories of
incarceration, this aim may be “too-little-too-late” to allow individuals to move past
transgression. Likewise, there are understandably many instances where the public would
want to know people’s criminal records, such as whether someone has committed acts of
sexual violence, or the tangible harms caused to victims of an individual’s wrongdoing.

8
The inclination towards forgiving past offenders tends to be at-odds with forgetting, even
though rehabilitation stands to encourage both recognition and forgiveness of the tough
task of reconciling acts of harm in community. Given the role of digital memory in
preserving histories of wrongdoing, what mechanisms for forgiveness, intentional
forgetfulness, or remembrance have different countries developed for dealing with the
past? How do these new policies and statutes in other countries reflect a potential
pathway for some U.S. right to privacy, particularly concerning criminal records? In this
thesis, I attempt to reconcile scholarship around stigma and criminal convictions, and the
importance of a right to privacy despite an individual’s past, within the context of the
existing legal and cultural context of the U.S.
The first section of this thesis provides background on the right to be forgotten
and the emergence of new manners of controlling one’s image online that have emerged
from the European Union, with detail towards looking at the applicability of these
forgetful policies to people with records of wrongdoing. In section II, I will explore the
relevant scholarship on privacy and the pressing needs for digital reforms to extend to
criminal justice spaces around privacy and preserving community. Through combining
scholarship on collateral consequences and the role of the carceral state, I situate the right
to be forgotten as a powerful tool of forgiveness, in allowing individuals some manner of
separation from their past actions, giving this mechanism for intentional forgetting
particular significance for people with criminal records. I also discuss my theoretical
framework and case selection in choosing France as a comparative analysis to the United
States. Section III develops the case of France, which has become the most prolific
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enforcer of the right to be forgotten in the EU and extends rights to privacy to all manners
of citizens, regardless of their criminal status. Section IV discusses the barriers to
developing a right to privacy in the United States, and how this has formed an
insurmountable barrier thus far to enacting comprehensive digital privacy and erasure
rights for U.S. consumers. Section V takes existing reforms in the United States and
attempts to situate lessons from the French case within the U.S. context.

Section II: Literature Review
In the United States, France, and the rest of the world, social developments have
coincided with these questions of digital privacy, such as reconciling an individual’s
social and legal rights of privacy with broader access to information. However, while
laws around digital privacy are being considered, co-evolving changes have been
happening in the criminal justice sphere. Given the adverse consequences of having a
criminal record, many countries (and some U.S. states) are grappling with how records of
incarceration fit into current social and digital frameworks. Many third-party websites
have emerged to re-publish and continue to circulate private court information about
carceral histories of individuals, even in cases where the individuals have been able to
expunge their record in courts, and where individuals may not have even been convicted
of a crime. While the information has always been public in the United States, the
internet has substantially lowered the cost of accessing the information of others. Thus,
the internet’s generative capacity allows for the publishing of truthful information;
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however, it also releases information that would have never been circulated through
analog pathways.
The right to be forgotten is just one possible pathway for confronting the
onslaught of digital information. In this section, I will discuss literature that looks at how
changes in the availability of information have affected the experiences of individuals
who pass through the criminal justice system, and then review the existing literature on
the construction of the right to be forgotten within a larger context of digital privacy and
identity. Combining this scholarship informs my theoretical framework around policy
developments, and the social concerns around wrongdoing and rehabilitation that emerge
in contemporary discourse of criminal justice.
Collateral Consequences and the Need for Reform
The application of digital privacy to cases of criminal wrongdoing exposes the
differing pathways through which a criminal record can affect someone’s life, even
decades after one’s transgression. Comparative criminal justice scholars have established
connections between punishment and an international trend towards harsher sentencing,
more punitive systems, and more consequences for wrongdoers, with the United States
leading the trend. Indeed, many scholars articulate how America’s criminal justice
system is one of the most punitive in the world, with racially stereotyped trends resulting
in a disproportionate incarceration for BIPOC populations (Tonry 1994, 2010a;
Alexander 2010; Walker 2010; Hinton 2016). The U.S. has also experienced a record
increase in the number of people incarcerated, and now has the world’s largest
incarcerated population and rate of incarceration, with 2.2 million incarcerated people in
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2010 and a rate of incarceration of 738 per 100,000 people (Steiker 2011, Hartney 2006).
The basis for this increase in incarceration, these scholars argue, bears no correlation to
actual increases in crime rates; rather it is due to more punitive sentencing policies. Tonry
and Alexander trace this heightened record of racialized incarceration to the War on
Drugs in the 1980s and 1990s, a political attempt to employ zero-tolerance crime
deterrents such as increased street-level policing in predominantly minority-populated
urban environments, resulting in an exponential increase in incarceration continuing to
the present. Tonry (1994) asserts that the politicized push for crime control, often
advanced by conservatives within both the Republican and Democratic parties, has
resulted in policies that uphold the War on Drugs campaigns of the Reagan and Bush
presidencies and champions highly punitive measures such as three-strikes policies and
mandatory minimum sentencing (Tonry 1994, 488). Broadening the discussion of
incarceration, Alexander (2010) maps out the problems of the prison-industrial complex
more broadly, including a lengthy discussion on the connections between criminal
records and prolonged exclusion from society and difficulty of re-integration postpunishment. Given the United States’ higher rates of policing and incarceration relative
to other countries, the issues faced by individuals who have some type of a criminal
record are relevant for looking at the long-reaching consequences of incarceration.
Facing what are often called collateral consequences, many former inmates (as
well as people who are booked temporarily and released) face barriers to re-entering
society; these can be the systematic denial of rights through legal means, such as voting
in elections, or social norms of exclusion, such as difficulty with employment or finding a
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place to live. Downes (2001) adds another dimension to this argument by suggesting that
collateral consequences of incarceration are neither accidental nor vestigial. These
increasingly harsh post-imprisonment sanctions are by design, Downes argues, and “the
removal of criminals from American society by penal means” creates the perception that
a utopian society can now be achieved (Downes 2001, 66). Chin (2012) builds on this
argument by discussing how the framework of civil death, suggesting that incarceration
and time served can actually be one of the milder consequences of the U.S. criminal
justice system, and that “the most severe and long-lasting punishment is not
incarceration, but the collateral consequences of losing civil rights, public benefits, etc.”
(Chin 2012, p. 1791). Chin (2012) continues this discussion of collateral consequences to
explain how contemporary punishments in the U.S. have historically been situated in
common law courts to legally alienate wrongdoers from the rest of society and stigmatize
their actions as socially unacceptable. Whether this means keeping people on parole or
probation for years after imprisonment, losses of legal status or civil rights, or preventing
former convicts from voting, lifelong consequences can debilitate one’s life, even without
serving jail time. This network of far-reaching barriers to reintegration has the potential
to affect everyone who has either been convicted or arrested, which works out to between
70 and 100 million Americans having some type of criminal record that prevents or slows
rehabilitation (Vallas 2014, 1). Other scholars argue that this mechanism of social control
and stigma is intentional; Kantorowicz (2014) and Aebi (2015) both argue that the
increased variety of incarceration options aims to increase rather than decrease the
number of people under state surveillance. In explorations of community sanctioning in
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the U.S. (Kantorowicz, 2014) and in Europe (Aebi, 2015), both scholars argue that
allowing for probation, parole, electronic monitoring services, and community service
simply “transfers criminals from custody to community”; that is, it puts the enforcement
of good behavior on society rather than prisons, but it effectively serves as a mechanism
for social control, causing a net-widening effect of people under the watch of government
and within existing networks of surveillance (Kantorowicz 2014, 4; Aebi 2015, 589).
Thus, wide-reaching reforms in criminal justice often serve to broaden the scope of
surveillance in the name of crime prevention.
The net-widening effect in criminal sanctioning raises many questions about the
nature of punishment and the internet’s role in transferring the responsibility of
generating stigma from the state to community members. Many scholars of comparative
criminal justice and the sociology of punishment demonstrate how the collateral
consequences of incarceration or conviction have far-reaching implications in the digital
age. Lageson (2016) explores both the psychological and economic impacts of having a
low-level criminal record. People with records avoid the increased visibility and potential
for discovery of their past that comes with higher-paying jobs and upward mobility and
experience a “systemic avoidance” of social and institutional support for people with
records (Lageson 2016; 136). In interviews with expungement-seekers, Lageson
characterizes the fear of discovery felt by many people who are unlikely to apply for jobs
that require background checks, social media reviews, or online search results, and she
argues that privately run websites and mugshot databases undermine the existing legal
system of courts sealing and expunging records. Haber (2018) further contextualizes the
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challenges of digital criminal expungement; she first outlines the rehabilitative goals of
expungement, which aims to reduce recidivism and discrimination against formerly
incarcerated people, and to reward people who work to reintegrate themselves back into
society. However, given easy online access to criminal histories, “digital data practices
make expungement statutes almost inapplicable, and even potentially facilitate a market
for expunged criminal histories” (Haber 2018, 351). Calvert and Bruno (2020) continue
this discussion around expungement laws; although the lived realities of people who
seem unable to forget their past are dire, pathways for expunging information are limited
in efficacy, particularly in the United States, against the First Amendment freedom of
expression. The tension that arises between the First Amendment’s implicit ‘right to
know’ of the public, and the personal control of information privacy is central to the issue
of where the line between public and private lies, especially concerning the potential
long-term disadvantage of having a criminal record or an arrest record. Calvert and Bruno
(2020) argue that, even in cases where the freedom of expression of the media reveals
the truth, these digital records may only tell a partial yet permanent account of a given set
of events, where “stories regarding the arrest and charging of an individual—regardless
of the outcome of the case…languish and linger in perpetuity in cyberspace and be easily
discovered through a few keystrokes on a Google search” (2020, 126). Even with existing
pathways for criminal record expungement, the digital recording and republication of
offenses has become ubiquitous; technology and widespread access to information has
changed the consequences of any interactions with the criminal justice system. Digital
publication of crimes, alleged crimes, or other instances of wrongdoing not only place an
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emotional and anxiety-provoking strain on the individuals named, but also place a burden
on society through the complex balancing act between an individual’s right to personal
privacy and other citizens’ right to know. If third-party databases exist for mugshots,
criminal proceedings, and other conviction information, it does not matter whether
information is expunged from the court records, as other citizens can easily access former
arrest records, convictions, or other potentially damning information (Calvert 2010).
Thus, issues of digital permanence challenge existing rules and regulations, such that the
U.S. system does not provide easy answers for people wishing to move beyond their past
transgressions.
Laws of Reputation and Personality Rights
The long-term consequences of incarceration and inability to return to society
underscore the pressing need for policy reform. Whether on social media, captured in
news articles, or regrettably posted by an individual, all kinds of digital information
populate archives, and can have the same damaging reputational effects that records of
incarceration have.
Different countries have proposed many different mechanisms to ensure
protection of their citizens’ dignity and virtual privacy. Whereas some countries impose
mandatory privacy policies to educate consumers about their digital footprints, others
enact digital protection regulation. In the United States, the approach has mainly centered
around this privacy policy approach; however, the norm has tended towards nonregulation and leaving individuals to make their own decisions about internet use. While
the United States has been slow to deal with the onslaught of challenges posed by the

16
internet, other countries have made considerable strides in evaluating and acknowledging
information about individuals online.
One of the key ways different countries have proposed to deal with these longterm consequences has been to look at the publication and recirculation of information as
a privacy and reputational matter. Whitman (2004) contends that historically rooted
conceptions of privacy in continental Europe and the United States inform modern
questions of privacy today, and the framing of the right to privacy as either a “dignity” or
“liberty” has broad implications for the type of protections a right to privacy can grant.
Whitman (2004) argues that while “perceptions of privacy” differ between Western
European countries and the United States, the commitment to privacy as a personal value
(and a value deserving of legal support), has robust theoretical support in both
jurisdictions (p. 1159). For example, Whitman uses the case of France to articulate how
honor used to be something reserved for people of status or wealth, yet the French
Revolution allowed for all citizens to benefit from incorporating privacy into the “law of
respect and etiquette” (2004, 1167). Constructing privacy as an intrinsic personality and
identity-building component has created a “right to a public image of our own making, as
the right to control our public face” (Whitman 2004, 1168). In contrast, Whitman
proposes, the U.S. framing of privacy as a “liberty” reflects a history of distrust of the
State and worries about infringement upon one’s home and private life by government
actors. While the continental construction of privacy focuses on the potential for
“personal or moral injury” from media, the U.S. understanding of privacy focuses on
preventing “invasions from government…invasion of his indefeasible right of personal
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security and private property” (Whitman, 2004, 1212). Through comparing cultural and
historical constructions of privacy, the differing laws and policies around digital privacy
reflect the existing cultural and legal norms of a country.
The Right to Be Forgotten: Adapting for the Digital World
Amid these opposing constructions of privacy before the digital age, different
countries have enacted (or refrained from implementing) drastically different conceptions
of digital privacy and the role of the consumer and citizen. These contrasts can perhaps
best be seen between the European Union member states and the United States. Whereas
the EU has enacted many of the foundational texts and policies for right to be forgotten
laws, the United States has been slow to confront the many problems faced by increasing
access to information. Historically, the American approach to information has favored
freedom of the press and freedom of speech, and deregulation of industry to allow the
free market to run its course, all of which have set the stage for a culture that values
transparency and the public’s right to know more than the ideal of privacy.
Digital privacy laws in the EU allow an individual to petition for removal of
truthful information if a certain amount of time has lapsed, or other qualifications around
time and active rehabilitation are undertaken. In contrast, the United States has a
centuries-long protection of freedom of the press, in order to ensure the media’s ability to
serve as a watchdog on government, circulate truthful information, and provide
transparency to U.S. citizens. This has resulted in a “transatlantic clash” between the E.U.
and the U.S. in terms of privacy rights (Rustad & Kulevska 2014, 376). Leta-Jones
(2016) articulates in Ctrl + Z how existing legal cultures have foreshadowed these
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divergent paths through the development of the right to be forgotten laws in Europe,
while the prevailing legal conditions of the United States have largely been unfavorable
to a right to be forgotten. Tech conglomerates based in the United States are forced to
cooperate with European data protection agencies to enforce the right to be forgotten,
while legislation for these tech companies in the United States lags behind these EU
standards, and often takes a decidedly pro-business stance against consumer privacy
protections.
Where does this leave the United States on digital privacy rights? The U.S.
commitment to the First Amendment freedom of press forms a fundamental obstacle to
removing old information, regardless of whether it is relevant given a person’s
transformation or growth. The United States has strong protections for freedom of the
press, and this only implies a right to privacy, defined by Werro (2009) as “a series of
attempts by the various states to carve out for their citizens a sphere of individual privacy
inviolable from the mass media” (p. 292). In contrast, the logic for granting the right to
be forgotten in the European Union rests on the need to equally balance the public’s right
to know with an individual's right to personal privacy—a right recognized under the
European Convention on Human Rights (Article 8, ECHR). Since no federally protected
right to privacy exists in the United States, there has been increased contention between
states, technology companies, scholars, and citizens around how to protect consumers’
privacy in digital spaces.
Hence, while the United States has seen some attempts to legislate privacy in
both statutes and case law, most of these attempts at regulating personal privacy have
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failed to effectively challenge the supremacy established by the First Amendment’s
freedom of the press. Yet, scholars, media, and movements within the United States show
support for some measure of digital privacy among U.S. citizens. Bode & Jones (2018)
found that 67% of U.S. citizens supported a right to be forgotten, and that support for a
right to be forgotten transcended typical Democrat-Republican divides (Bode & Jones
2018, 253). Thus, while there appears to be growing support for a right to be forgotten or
some other measures of ensuring digital privacy, the United States has seen slow, if not
insignificant, movement on the right to be forgotten.
While the First Amendment has thus far posed significant barriers to digital
privacy statutes, many pundits, scholars, and legislators have suggested alternative
pathways towards protecting one’s personal information online. In suggesting alternatives
to the U.S. default of persisting digital remembrance, Leta-Jones (2016) suggests that
creating a mechanism more in line with “U.S. forgiveness and information stewardship”
could be implemented through digital addenda to existing search engine results that
marks information as old or otherwise incorrect (p. 149). The idea behind this measure
would be to implement a right to respond for individuals online by allowing that
“information can be added to harmful content to provide context and accuracy” (LetaJones. 148). While this solution would allow some form of moving forward past
transgression for individuals, Leta-Jones also discusses how this would leave a “mass of
expired informational waste and would add conflicting information to the pile,” such that
adding context and accurate information may not offer enough relief from one’s past
(Ibid. 149).
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Given the potential legal and social barriers to a right to be forgotten in the U.S.,
other scholars argue for different piecemeal approaches to digital privacy, or a more
limited right to be forgotten, to be transplanted to the United States as well as to the rest
of the world. Leta-Jones offers a potential solution via a narrower right to be forgotten,
through “remixing false-light and retraction law” to make a viable right to digital
oblivion in the United States (Leta-Jones 2016, 148). In contrast, Colgate Love (2003)
argues for a path forward through rehabilitation and transformation, but instead extends
the argument of rehabilitation through public reckoning, or a right of the individual to
respond to information posted about them online. She argues that while pathways for
expungement do not necessarily have to be adopted, there must be some form of
systematic review of rehabilitation for formerly incarcerated people. While a society need
not forget one’s crimes and wrongdoings through sealing records or deleting them upon
release from incarceration, there must be pathways for one to “restore to society’s good
graces” (Love 2003, 1709). Maruna (2011) continues this discussion of the value of
public recognition and forgiveness as potentially necessary parts of rehabilitation. Rather
than having a time-expiration or a passive expungement of information, Maruna argues
that active rehabilitation through acknowledgement of wrongdoing serves to lessen
consequences faced by offenders, and that “reintegration is a 'two-way street'” between
an individual and the society they return to, such that a society must know one’s past and
still be able to forgive (Maruna 2011, 106). There must be some repentance by the
individual who has done wrong or caused harm, but an equal recognition of such
rehabilitation efforts and some kind of pathway back into society; otherwise, there is little
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point to an individual trying to change their life, move on from past mistakes, or grow in
any way. Thus, having a certification process—of both inaccurate or outdated
information, or to mark one’s progress beyond wrongdoing—allows for a public
acknowledgement, acceptance, and ultimately forgiveness in both a social and legal
context, without the same removal of information on the internet.
Given technology’s progress and the generative environment of the internet, new
technology will always outpace developments in regulation and legislation, and even the
ethical frameworks that inform laws. With this growing “ethics gap” between technology
and law, many scholars argue that existing laws in the United States are not flexible
enough to accommodate the unforeseen circumstances and speed of development
initiated by the digital age (Moor 1998, 16). Brock (2016) articulates that any reform for
digital privacy will likely “distort the original purpose” of the law (Brock 2016, 34).
Concerned with the potential effects of censorship on news media and mass
communication, Brock argues that the right to be forgotten, as envisioned by the EU, will
likely result in a culling of accurate information and the public’s right to know. Given the
asymmetry between digital advancement and the timeline for development of policy in
response, Brock and others argue that the EU’s right to be forgotten may over-develop
consumer protections to cause widespread censorship of information. Brock argues that
“data protection rebranded as the right to be forgotten, however well-intentioned, carries
the risk of shrinking freedom of expression” (2016, p. 37).
Though the U.S. has resisted a right to be forgotten (or other measures of digital
privacy), the future of the right in the United States still garners considerable
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international and domestic debate. Why has the U.S. been slow to address digital privacy
concerns, especially considering that certain dimensions of privacy have already been
developed? Many scholars have explored the apparent contradiction of the right to be
forgotten with existing First Amendment protections of freedom of speech. Frank
Pasquale (2015) challenges this narrative of First Amendment supremacy in the United
States by looking at existing laws protecting medical information and bankruptcy records
and charters a path forward for legal reform around digital privacy. Pasquale contends
that laws already exist to protect privacy in some contexts, namely concerning medical
privacy; HIPAA rules prevent patient information from being released, and “internet
providers can be held responsible” if data breaches happen (Pasquale 2016, 530).
Similarly, the Fair Credit Reporting Act, the basic laws surrounding bankruptcy, outlines
a delisting process for any bankruptcy after 10 years, intentionally building in a policy
mechanism to allow a fresh start for people who otherwise would be unable to move on.
These existing laws, Pasquale argues, assume that people who have gone through
bankruptcy should be given a second chance and allowed to continue their participation
in the economy once they have financially recovered from bankruptcy.
Though various scholars have explained the challenges and collateral
consequences faced by individuals with criminal records and past convictions, and other
scholars have explored the rapidly changing dimensions of the right to privacy in the
digital age, there is a lack of research into how privacy rights could address the many
issues plaguing people with arrest or conviction records and could redefine the rights of
all citizens under the new digital regime. Criminal justice reform must clearly address the
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gaps in regulation that allow criminal records to be published and republished, but how
can a country’s existing legal framework define the dimensions of progress for criminal
justice reform online? In this study, I will explore the creation of a right to privacy before
the digital age, existing legal and criminal frameworks around rehabilitation, and an
exploration of case law in a two-case country comparison—France and the United
States—in order to shed light on potential privacy reforms in the age of information.
Framework and Case Selection
Privacy has undergone a change in its meaning and scope in light of widespread
availability of information online, coinciding with changes in the criminal justice system
and larger questions on a statutory and regulatory level of what rights ought to be
extended to citizens in the era of digital information. In each of the two country cases,
France and the United States, there have been opposite approaches to digital privacy; in
France, the adoption of a right to be forgotten, and in the U.S., a refusal to legislate on the
issues of digital privacy. I have chosen France as a civil-law country exemplifying the
protection of privacy in the digital age. While the initial right to be forgotten case was
heard in the Spanish court (AEPD), France’s data-protection agency (CNIL) has
considerably expanded upon the right to be forgotten through active enforcement of the
GDPR, being the most active with requests for deindexing information. Likewise, France
also has comprehensive measures to ensure privacy for ex-offenders and to provide a
pathway for desistance from crime. Given these robust privacy protections in France,
coupled with rehabilitative criminal justice measures that allow individuals to move
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beyond their transgressions, France offers an interesting corollary case for applying
lessons learned in digital spaces to existing criminal justice systems.
In contrast, the United States shows how the common-law framework has proven
less adaptable to emerging issues (such as the rapid development of technology), and the
U.S. Constitution and statutory protections divide the right to privacy into different levels
of protection. Coupled with punitive criminal justice systems, the right to privacy offers
few mechanisms for forgetting one’s past, especially for people with records of
wrongdoing.
Using an inductive approach and thematic analysis of legal doctrines of privacy, I
will draw observations from case law, legal culture and theories of privacy, and the
specific legislative developments of the right to be forgotten. In looking at a country with
more success in implementing digital privacy, I will identify patterns that could lead to
potential policy channels for a right to digital privacy in the United States. I will also
explore how existing legal frameworks and the punitive nature of a country’s criminal
justice system lend themselves to either more rehabilitative or more punitive digital
privacy laws, in order to characterize whether adopting a “tough on crime” approach
means a country will also be “tough on digital footprints.” Each section of this thesis will
focus on one of the country cases and will address the different historical and case-law
underpinnings for privacy before and after the advent of the internet, the differences
between a right to be forgotten in the civil versus criminal law contexts, and the cultural,
legal, and political contexts of the countries in question.
Section III: France: A Model for Right to Be Forgotten Enforcement
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While the first court cases that tested the right to be forgotten came out of Spain
with Google v. Spain (AEPD), much of the underlying framework for data privacy can be
found in French court decisions leading up to the digital age. In this section, I highlight
how France’s existing legal culture, including its hybrid-civil law background on privacy
tort law, paved the way for the digital right to privacy. Likewise, France’s longstanding
constitutional commitment to the citizen’s right to privacy over the public’s right to know
allows the French government and data protection agencies to enact digital privacy
policies and regulation more adeptly than other European nations or the United States.
A “Remarkably Uncivil” Introduction of the French Privacy Right
The ways countries confront wrongdoing and rehabilitation, as well as privacy,
have been shaped by developments long before the digital age. The commitment to one’s
own information has long been considered a right granted to French citizens. Although it
is now considered a firmly cemented right of the French citizen, the right to privacy, and
the ability to control information about oneself, begins its journey not in the French Civil
Code, as we might expect from a civil law country, but rather in the courts.
The Civil Code became France’s first attempt to codify all the rights and
responsibilities of the French citizen, following the philosophical traditions of building a
legally enforceable social contract. Broadly, the Code defined property rights and the
equality of all people under law. However, throughout the first iterations of the Civil
Code going into the mid-19th century, there was still no explicit mention of privacy
rights. Rather, the Code demonstrated the civil law tradition of codifying all human rights
that one receives by virtue of living in a society and under the State. Some of the early
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French rights protected by law included the rights to freely form thoughts (and express
those thoughts), and property rights, with both of these rights finding ideological roots in
the Declaration on the Rights of Man and of the Citizen. Reflecting the spirit of
revolution and the fears of censorship by the government, the Declaration on the Rights
of Man is laden with protections for the right to be able to “speak, write, and publish
freely,” in order to be an enfranchised citizen (Declaration on the Rights of Man and of
the Citizen, Article 11). This ability freely falls into the “moral rights” of the creator: that
the product of one’s writings and musings, one’s very thoughts, are an intrinsic part of
one’s human nature (Hauch 1994, 1230). Connecting to an individual’s rights as a citizen
implies an understanding that one must have freedom of thought in order to freely engage
in a democratic forum. If one cannot freely express themselves fully, they cannot be a
functioning member of a democratic society. However, ascribing thoughts and ideas as a
measure of personhood and citizenship alone does not provide adequate protection (or
any sort of legally enforceable rule) to a person’s right to privacy, and a right to control
information about oneself.
However, the other component of state-building within the document is the
concession of living in society. One must abnegate some rights in order to allow for
society to function. In order to balance these two opposing truths, the Declaration of the
Rights of Man articulates the idea of liberty of action, that “liberty consists in the freedom
to do everything which injures no one else” (Article 4). This assertion that neither society
nor government has control over an individual’s personhood-building right to be left
alone, except when they infringe upon another's rights and jurisdiction, allows much
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more flexibility within French legislation and jurisprudence (Braxten-Craven 1976, 706).
Although these protected rights—the ability to freely form thoughts and the “liberty” to
do anything that does not harm another—do not entirely constitute a right to privacy, they
become conflated with ‘personality rights’ by numerous French judicial decisions.
Beginning in the mid-1850s, new innovations occurred that allowed for people to
capture likenesses more easily, and the boundary of what constituted one’s property
began to take on an amorphous dimension. In 1858, a case arose involving a reproduced
and circulated sketch of a celebrity on their deathbed, which allowed the court to begin to
develop the boundary of what counts as one’s “property.” A famous actress named
Rachel was photographed on her deathbed by her family, with the photographer under
strict orders to not publish or replicate the photos, yet sketches based off of these photos
began circulating in the press. In the 1858 Rachel decision, the lower Tribunal Court
(Tribunaux de Instance) ruled in favor of the plaintiff, resulting in the destruction of the
artist’s sketches and removal of any media (Beverly 2005, 147). The judge listed the
“emotional damages” and violation of privacy as protected under Article 1382 of the
Civil Code, which states that “any act whatsoever of man, which causes damage to
another, obliges the one by whose fault it happened to repair it,” and in the judge’s ruling
of this case, the moral damages caused to the family by leaking this photo amounted to
enough harm that they demanded the image be destroyed (Hauch 1994, 1232). Thus, the
judge interpreted the photo depicting a person, or any creative works that depict one’s
likeness, to be an indelible part of one’s personhood in France.
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While this may not seem revolutionary, the Rachel decision established the first
instance of interpreting one’s own image as an intrinsic part of what are now deemed
‘personality rights.’ Personality rights encompass all of the identity-forming and
intellectual property dimensions of speech and of material creation, the qualities that are
“attached to the person and cannot be waived or alienated” (Hauch 1994, 1230). Since the
Rachel decision, the French courts have argued time and again that personality rights are
intrinsic to an individual, and they are able to be extended and withdrawn only by their
person. Thus, the ability to claim damages against infringement of one’s personality
“should be based, not on the rules of property, whether material or artistic, but on the
right every human being has to have his personality respected” (Beverly 2005, 148).
While no explicit links existed between personality and property rights, the courts
established a strong connection between personality and ownership of one’s likeness and
one’s ideas. In this landmark decision, the courts stretched the idea of the property rights
of the family to encompass a reproduction of a photo, acknowledging that “the courts
were left to deal with unforeseen situations and had to do so with the limited resources of
the Code” (Bernard Audit 1978, 753).
This use of court decisions and case law precedent is notable because France, like
many other European countries, draws its legal system from the civil law tradition,
whereby the government uses “written reason” as the predominant method of deciding
disputes (Radamaker 2002, 130). Thus, since the mid-1850s, French judges have been
tasked with interpreting these broader rights articulated in the Civil Code in new and
uncertain circumstances. Emerging technology, such as the daguerreotype (a predecessor
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of the camera), were combined with existing laws in the Civil Code to almost demand
that French judges play a more heavy-handed role than solely “applying the law”
(Reichel 2007, 109). Courts were tasked with defining the extent of damages and whether
one could seek legal recourse for what amounts today to invasion of privacy: “Without
benefit of any legislative guidance on the subject, French judges essentially created the
right to oppose the publication of private facts” (Hauch 1994, 1231). This legal precedent
held for almost a century, where judges repeatedly followed this initial ruling to oppose
disclosures of an individual’s privacy. In these few hallmark cases involving “personality
rights,” courts had little legal framework in which to situate their decisions, and thus had
to create judicial precedent in the absence of laws, such that “the right to one’s name and
the right to one’s image are nevertheless firmly established in French law,
notwithstanding their purely jurisprudential origin” (Beverly-Smith 2005, 153).
In addition to the Rachel decision, other cases emerged around personality rights
in this era; the Dietrich case over a century later featured the release of true historical
accounts of the life of German Actress Marlene Dietrich without her consent (Marlene
Dietrich v. Société France-Dimanche 1955, Cour d’Appel de Paris). In accordance with
the personality rights that the French judiciary has historically upheld, the appellate
courts in Paris ordered Société to pay damages, claiming that “an individual’s
reminiscences of his private life form part of his moral capital,” and that this fell under
the purview of the existing rights to privacy and personality as laid out by former French
case law (Markesinis 2009). Thus, French personality rights developed, in part, from an
abnormal use of the judiciary system to set the boundary of personality rights as a
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mixture of “property” and “liberty,” which then became enumerated and codified into the
French Civil Code.
Though the right to privacy drew its legitimacy from case law precedents, the
legislative origin of French privacy rights connected to new developments of privacy
across Europe, with the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms in 1953, along with an explicit addition of a right to privacy in
France in 1970. The French Parliament initiated new amendments to the Civil Code with
Article 9, which enacted a broad right to require respect for one’s privacy as a
personality-forming right, such that “everyone has the right to respect for his or her
private life” (Article 9, Civil Code). In addition to stating the relevant rights around one’s
private life, this article also established an action plan for violations of one’s private life,
including a section in the Criminal Code set aside for individuals who violate another’s
right to privacy (Deringer 2003, 196). On one hand, for more minor information releases,
the plaintiff can sue for damages; on the other hand, for major violations of privacy, one
can ask for a total injunction of the information (Hauch 1994, 1242). Therefore, while
judges still play an active role in the enforcement of the right to privacy, the right has
become firmly cemented in French culture, such that invasions of privacy become a
violation not only of social and cultural norms, but of law as well. With this legislative
push behind privacy rights, the right to privacy in France moved from an implicit, judicial
precedent towards an explicit, constitutionally protected right.
Rehabilitation and Desistance through Privacy
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In France, the right to privacy has been enacted through legal codification and
judicial policymaking, such that individuals have the ability to prevent personal
information from becoming public. However, does this right also apply to individuals in
France with records of incarceration? Another key takeaway for the French laws on
privacy, and specifically moving towards digital privacy, are the implications for the
criminal justice system. In France, the criminal justice system maintains comprehensive
records of arrest, conviction, and imprisonment on its population. In contrast with the
U.S. system where records are considered public information, criminal records of French
citizens cannot be accessed by the general public, except for in narrow circumstances
where an individual’s employment may put them into contact with vulnerable
populations (children, e.g.). Privacy and respect for every person’s dignity has been a
prominent feature of the French criminal justice system, which translates to people
convicted of wrongdoing. In implementing privacy through criminal record
expungement, the French judiciary engages in the practice of ‘judicial rehabilitation,’
which is designed to show society that an individual is actively participating in
transformation after their actions of wrongdoing.
Information about criminal records is considered extremely sensitive by the
French government, and these records are legally only allowed to be stored by the
National Judicial Record (NJR), a national database established for maintaining records
of all French citizens. Article 777 of the French Criminal Code lays out the regulations
around reporting and publishing criminal records in France (Act no. 70-663, Criminal
Code). Under these regulations, an individual’s criminal history is classified as sensitive
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information only available to government administrators in most cases, and by the
individual seeking their own criminal record in others. The organization of records
follows a delineation of histories of criminal offenses into three categories, known as
bulletins. The 1° bulletin is reserved for administrators within the NJR, unable to be
accessed by anyone outside of the criminal justice suite (Article 774-1, Criminal Code).
The 2° bulletin allows for certain governmental authorities to see an individual’s record
of felonies or misdemeanors in the case of the individual seeking “public employment,
joining the military, filing in bankruptcy courts, or engaging in any public or private
enterprise with cultural, educational, or social activity with minors” (Article 776).
However, numerous exceptions exist for information on the 2° bulletin; for example,
where sentences under 5 years are automatically removed after a time, or are excluded
from the record by the judge’s orders either at the time of conviction or after the sentence
has been served (Article 775-11). Lastly, the 3° bulletin reflects an individual’s criminal
record for felonies and misdemeanors which are not excluded from the 2° bulletin, such
as in the case that the individual may have habitual volunteer or professional exposure to
minors in their jobs (Article 777). Thus, the access to information about an individual’s
past wrongdoing has a system of checks to make sure that past criminal records are only
accessed on a need-to-know basis.
As Herzog-Evans explains, access to an individual’s criminal records is protected
to ensure that the courts—and by extension, the records of criminal wrongdoing that the
courts create and maintain—do not jeopardize an individual’s attempts to reintegrate into
society after conviction. The goal of crime prevention “precisely requires for the person
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to have social and human capital,” which translates to the ability to socialize oneself back
into society through work, housing, and structures which help reintegration (HerzogEvans 2011, 7). The goals of the French criminal justice system are to encourage
individuals to engage in prosocial behavior and to hopefully prevent return into the prison
system, so France’s criminal code supports this mission by providing much more
stringent rules around reporting of criminal records. Thus, the goal of society is to
uphold a culture of forgiveness through selective informational awareness.
Given this, the various bulletin processes serve as a first-order control over who
can see an individual’s record of wrongdoing, with the different levels of accessibility
allowing an individual to have a better chance of moving on post-transgression. Although
Herzog-Evans does describe instances of employers in high-trust industries (banks,
working with children) needing access to an individual’s record, the highest French Court
(Cour de Cassation) ruled that an individual does not have to share their criminal record
with employers in most cases, which has cemented French jurisprudence as part of a
“desistance-friendly” culture (Ibid. 8). So, the French legislation under the Criminal
Penal Code and the High Court have both embraced the mindset that a potential answer
to criminal wrongdoing is to engage in active reintegration as a form of recidivism
prevention.
The three main mechanisms of record expungement in France are automatic
deletion, legal rehabilitation, and merit-based judicial rehabilitation (Herzog-Evans 2011,
11). Automatic deletions occur after a certain period of time, without any input from the
individual. Usually, this passive process occurs after 40 years, and again at 100 years, if
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an individual is still alive, in order to demonstrate goodwill towards the elderly (Maruna
2011, 101). Legal rehabilitation also occurs after a period of time and occurs when an
individual has remained “crime-free” for that time after release (Ibid. 98). In contrast to
both of these more passive, time-tracked processes, France also has an active
participation process under judicial rehabilitation, which allows an individual to
demonstrate an “honor roll” status after their sentence where they have both desisted
from crimes, made amends to the victims of their actions, engaged in visible displays of
rehabilitation, taken accountability for one’s previous actions; they can then be eligible
for a judge to clear their record from the 2° and 3° bulletins (Herzog-Evans 2011, 13-14).
This process is regarded very seriously within the France judicial system, whereby an exoffender is examined in every instance of their time since conviction, to observe whether
they are “truly a desister” (Ibid. 15). This use of judicial rehabilitation reflects the
solemnity inherent in certifying the rehabilitation of an individual before wiping one’s
slate clean, but it also builds in a model for allowing forgiveness and forgetfulness to
extend to one’s past.
While these processes for record expungement do exhibit considerable
concordance with the right to privacy in France, they also serve to recognize the
importance of public reckoning with criminal justice and the ripples of harm caused by
transgression within one’s broader community. Recognizing both the harms caused by
the individual and the performance of stigma throughout conviction processes, judicial
rehabilitation stands to ameliorate the social, emotional, and economic consequences of
having a criminal past. Not only does this serve as a personal emblem of transformation
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for the ex-offender, but more importantly, it serves as a symbol to the community and
people surrounding the ex-offender (Maruns 2011, 109). As the French case
demonstrates, an individual’s right to privacy (especially in terms of criminal records)
can still be preserved while also acknowledging one’s past actions, through having a
judicially supervised process which balances both the right to privacy of one individual
and the right to see that a person has actually engaged in rehabilitation.
While the stated goal of French imprisonment is to rehabilitate individuals, and to
have the punishment be done upon release from prison, there are still some limits to one
‘wiping their record clean.’ Judicial rehabilitation is not available to every ex-offender,
and crimes of sexual violence and harm against children are ineligible for removal. In
contrast to pathways for judicial rehabilitation, people convicted of sexual offenses must
enroll in the NJR’s database for Sexual Offenders, which codifies a process for
communicating an individual’s sexual offender status to relevant local authorities, such as
reporting any changes of address to police (National Judicial Record for Sexual and
Violent Offenders). However, this database is still only accessible by relevant authorities,
and when an ex-offender may work or volunteer with vulnerable populations, so it does
not form as serious a barrier to an individual’s return to society as in other countries’ laws
around sexual offenses (for example, SORNA laws in the United States, which can
require an individual to notify one’s community, not solely law enforcement) (HerzogEvans 2011, 8). In recognizing the causes of recidivism, French criminal justice records
for even the most serious sexual offense crimes are still kept private in an attempt to
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distance an individual from their previous acts of harm, and to prevent further acts of
crime.
Privacy as a Fundamental, yet Relative Right
Privacy has remained an indelible part of the legal rights of French citizens,
whether in photographs of an individual, written accounts, or in digital spaces. Although
the entirety of the GDPR, the Civil Code in France, and the assertion of the right to
privacy in the European Convention on Human Rights (Article 8) all delineate the bounds
of the right to privacy afforded to French citizens, the right to privacy still exists in
tension with the freedom of expression. The French Parliament incorporated a right to
expression into the 1881 Freedom of the Press Law. However, the French right to
expression will likely be unusual to U.S. audiences, given that it also recognizes the
potential violations that can occur at the hands of the press, and in the name of public
interest.
Thus, while the right to press is still enshrined in the French Civil Code, the right
to publish information has limits; that is, freedom of expression is not an absolute right.
While the right to privacy protects a person’s dignity, access to information promotes
democracy and the transfer of ideas, with “the internet play[ing] an important role in
enhancing the public’s access to news,” thus serving as a vital check on democracy (Kulk
and Borgesius 2017, 9). The Civil Code acknowledges both the right of others to know
information about us and the right to one’s privacy, such that the right to expression and
the right to privacy are weighted equally.
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While foundational revolutionary texts reflect the need for freedom of expression
to serve as a vital component of democracy in France, the right to expression is not
viewed in a vacuum. Rather, an individual’s right to privacy must temper the ‘right to
know’ in France, such that the freedom of expression is constrained much more readily
than the U.S. French laws and authorities air on the side of protecting an individual’s
right to privacy, unless in cases of public interest. France still maintains a strong right to
freedom of expression under Article 11, yet this ability to “speak, write, and print with
freedom” becomes tempered by the content that it contains; an individual is held
accountable for their speech when it infringes upon the rights of another (Article 11,
Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen).
This protection of a right to privacy can be seen in how individuals in the public’s
interest (be they celebrities or politicians) are able to sue for invasion of privacy. While
interesting gossip about celebrities or embarrassing photos of politicians may be
considered public domain elsewhere, France’s privacy protections demonstrate that the
right to privacy trumps the public’s right to know, except in cases when an individual’s
private life has been seen to “cause” the public incident. Celebrity status alone does not
meet that threshold for newsworthiness. In the 1996 case involving the inviolate
personality protection of all people under French law, the Sachs decision involved
republication of known information about a celebrity. In the Sachs case, a famous
German playboy sued after Lui, a French newspaper, published an article about his life.
While most of the information in this publication was already in the public record, the
Cour de Cassation, the highest court in France, declared that the prior consent of an
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individual in publication does not translate to the media being able to republish
information. That is, “prior cooperation does not create a presumption that he would
permit any magazine to assemble and reproduce” information about the decision (Palmer
2020, 265). Even individuals who profit from their public image are entitled to
considerable protection of their personal lives in France; courts recognize that even
celebrities have a private life away from the public eye.
Given the well-defined right to privacy for all citizens in France, it is no surprise
that celebrities remain protected from public scrutiny in many disputes about privacy.
And, the widespread protection of privacy as an innate personality right attaches itself to
people, not places, to allow for celebrities (and other individuals) to control their image
even when in public spaces.
Privacy into the Digital Age
While both the 1858 Rachel decision and the 1970 addition of Article 9 into the
Civil Code created the right for privacy within France, French legislators took a proactive
approach to looking at the effects of the internet on enforcing French privacy law. As
early as 1978, the French Parliament passed Act no.78-17 of 6 January 1978, “On Data
Processing, Data Files and Individual Liberties.” This French Data Privacy Law laid out
the continuation of French rights into the digital world, such that the “data processing
shall be at the service of every citizen” (Section 1, Act 78-17). Notably, this information
technology law laid the groundwork for the right to claim personal data as an extension
of one’s private life. The law expresses the need for widespread access to technology, yet
access that “must not infringe human identity, human rights, privacy, or individual or
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public freedoms” (Article 1, 78-17). Thus, the French legislature implemented policies to
allow for a continuation of the already-established privacy rights of the individual to be
translated into the digital realm.
In addition to setting up the early case for digital privacy, the 1978 law also
established the National Commission for Information Technology and Civil Liberties
(CNIL), the French data protection agency. This Data Privacy Law, and the powers
granted to the data protection agency, have since been updated in 2000, 2004, and finally
in 2016, such that the latest version states that any French data subject has the right to
control information about one’s self, to “correct, complete, update, or delete personal
data” if it is deemed inaccurate, incomplete or out-of-date (Article 40). Today, the CNIL
is the French regulation agency responsible for pursuing data privacy complaints, and for
enforcing search engines to comply with the terms laid out in the EU-wide General Data
Protection Regulation (GDPR). Thus, the French government has both worked in tandem
with the EU’s broader data protection through the establishment of the GDPR, yet they
have also developed a separate body of legislation to enforce and codify the French
citizen’s rights to privacy in the face of changing digital technology.
The Road to the GDPR
The first right to be forgotten case was heard in Spain with Google v. Spain in
2014. The EU-wide appellate court, known as the Court of Justice for the European
Justice (CJEU), heard the appeal, which allowed for the right to be forgotten to become
an embedded process for residents of the European Union under the 2018 General Data
Protection Regulation (GDPR) codification. While the right to erasure has become a
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standard for all member states of the EU, data privacy protection in France draws
credibility from a history of robust personal privacy, as well as movement toward data
protection and regulation before the GDPR was enacted in 2018.
In the Google v. Spain decision, the plaintiff referenced a violation of the 1995
Data Privacy Directive and his right to control his own data around a home foreclosure.
The DPD allowed for the “right to privacy with regard to personal data” (Directive
95/46/EC). This provided the initial legal basis for subjects to control the processing of
their personal data online, and it hinged upon the role of data controllers and processors,
like Google, and the extent to which they can elevate or lower certain search results.
Upon hearing this case, the CJEU ruled in favor of the plaintiff, Mario Costeja
Gonzales, who was able to petition Google for removal of information about his personal
history. The CJEU extended this reasoning further, to argue that search engines must
remove—upon request—any information that one deems inadequate, irrelevant or no
longer relevant, or excessive” (Xue 2016, 389). Given the implications across the EU for
this interpretation of the 1995 Data Protection Directive, further developments resulted in
the formal codification of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) in 2016,
which would be rolled-out over a two-year period, beginning in 2018. The General Data
Protection Regulation’s legal charter doubled down on the EU’s commitment to the rights
of digital privacy for citizens: “the protection of natural persons in relation to the
processing of personal data is a fundamental right” (Regulation EU 2016/679).
Under the GDPR, the European Union allows the right to erasure to be applied in
all member states, without each individual country needing to specify a law on the right
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to be forgotten. Standardizing the procedure for the right to be forgotten streamlines the
policy in two ways; one, it lowers the transaction costs between states when “condensing
the informational and redemptive strategies” for both search engines and governments to
enforce the right to be forgotten and delist results, and two, it provides all of the EU
states with the power of collective bargaining (Leta-Jones 2016, 166). While the GDPR
extended the right to be forgotten to the EU as a whole, the “interpretation and
enforcement” of the data protection guidelines still remains a power of individual
agencies (GDPR 2018).
The CJEU and the final GDPR legislation left the specific balancing of the right
to privacy and the right to expression up to each Member State: “The GDPR text itself
seems to retain elements of a directive with specific delegations of responsibilities to
Member States to enact enabling laws” (Klinefelter-Wrigley 2021, 727). Hence, the
preference for respecting an individual’s right to privacy over the community’s right to
know—particularly in France—is evident; the 2018 GDPR law created a well-defined
right to control one’s own data as well as the means to petition for removal of any
information (Articles 15 and 17, GDPR). While the courts and the legislation both
asserted that an individual retains a proprietary ability to control information about
themselves online, they also assert that this right does not exist in isolation. Rather, the
digital privacy of the individual must be balanced against the public’s right to know. That
is, “the judgment vigorously made it clear that none of the competing interests, in
particular, individual privacy right and public freedom of expression are exclusive,
therefore, both of them can be restricted, if appropriate reasons are found reconciled
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within the law” (Faisal 2021, 7). Thus, in the EU, neither the individual’s right to privacy
nor the right to expression is absolute. Likewise, the GDPR allows for individuals to
petition data controllers for removal of certain links to sources on a specific site, while
the process for complete removal of the information from the internet as a whole would
require a separate request, such that the “display of a link in search results must be
considered separately from the initial publication of the information” (Globocnik 2020,
380). However, the burden of proof for whether something counts as within the public’s
purview more often than not tips towards the individual’s right to privacy.
France’s Eager Adoption of the 2018 GDPR
With the passage of the GDPR, the right to be forgotten has since become
ingrained into French civil rights and serves as a signal of the French commitment to the
right to privacy in digital spaces. Although the ‘right to delete’ was first enacted for the
entire EU in 2018, the French legislature began developing legislation that would
eventually support the French right to be forgotten decades earlier. While the origins of
digital privacy for the broader EU date back to the 1995 EU-wide Data Protection
Directive, France had already established its eminence within the field of digital
protection for citizens in 1978 with the French Data Protection Act (Act n°78-17 of
January 6, 1978). Indeed, this early adoption of privacy rights has set the standard for
France to be a model adopter of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR).
Likewise, given France’s early adoption of digital privacy into the Civil Code, it should
come as no surprise that French legislators sought to codify digital privacy above and
beyond the EU right to be forgotten policy. While the EU-wide GDPR was implemented
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in Regulation (EU) 2016/679 to go into effect in 2018, the French Parliament passed a
separate bill, Law n° 2018-493, known colloquially as “The French GDPR Law,” which
amended the existing 1978 Data Privacy Act to better reflect the evolving language of
internet privacy, as established in the GDPR. This 2018 law amended the 1978 Data
Protection Law to exhibit concordance with the GDPR, but also went beyond some of the
regulatory guidelines established in the GDPR. Some of these requirements under French
law stress the ability for an individual to find out what kinds of personal data exists about
them, as well as key recommendations to data controllers (internet providers, search
engines, and other large technology companies) on how they can best meet the standards
laid out by the French GDPR Law. This allows for participation from tech companies in
the process of data regulation; CNIL not only encourages the development of codes of
conduct and new ethical standards, but it allows for interface between the governmental
regulators and key industry players. Under the amended law, CNIL has been granted
additional legislative power in order to actually challenge and regulate in the face of
massive corporate interests. This includes protecting people without much digital literacy
(Section 1, Law n° 2018-493), as well as individuals with criminal records, medical
information, and all other extremely sensitive information that could face additional risks
by virtue of immediate access to the internet. Thus, the prior legislative steps taken by the
French Parliament on properly assessing the new benefits, and risks, of technology
allowed CNIL to take an early lead on digital privacy across the European Union.
CNIL has been active in their oversight of the right to be forgotten; the process of
the right to petition for deletion first goes through Google, or other public search engines
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deemed “data controllers” under the GDPR’s guidelines. For example, if Google refuses
to delist the petitioner’s request, the individual can then appeal this decision either to the
EU-member country’s courts or to the country’s data protection agency. CNIL has, for
example, challenged Google’s attempts to limit the right to deletion to only EU countries,
arguing that the right to delete applies to all French citizens, regardless of their location.
In 2014, CNIL’s lead regulator argued for the right to be forgotten to be applied globally,
given that search engines are legally required to remove information after the petitioning
process in select jurisdictions but do not necessarily need to delist information in other
locations (for example, one could find an article on Google.com that was delisted in
Google.fr) (Satariano 2019, NYT). Regulators in France reasoned that a delisted article’s
reappearance in another country effectively “circumvented EU law,” and thus decided to
outline a written basis for compelling search engines to de-list information outside of
national domains (Article 29, Data Protection Working Party). However, Google
appealed this new ruling from the French regulators, arguing that requiring delisting of
links across the entire Google suite would amount to censorship for all non-French
internet users. The regulation actions were eventually declared unconstitutional by the
CJEU in 2019, which ruled against the data protection agency and this territorial
extension of the right to be forgotten (Marsh 2019). Even though the French data
protection regulators lost this appeal about the territorial limits of the right to be forgotten
across all of Google’s country domains, the right to be forgotten still applies to the 28
Member States of the European Union.
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Considering the CJEU’s judicial curbing of CNIL’s authority, many important
interpretations of the right to be forgotten are still in development in France. In the past
two cycles of review of the right to be forgotten, which occurred in 2014 and 2020, the
French data protection authority has overseen an exponential increase in people visiting
the CNIL webpage, and a large number of right-to-delete requests (CNIL Activity Report
2020). If the request for delisting is not approved by Google (because the information is
in the public interest, or the request does not meet the “outdated” standard or is otherwise
not treated with “undue delay”), then individuals can file a formal complaint with CNIL.
In 2014, CNIL received 5,825 complaints from individuals around Google’s deliberations
on right to delete cases (2014 Activity Report). In 2020, CNIL received 13,585
complaints from French citizens against search engines, marking a 62% increase since
the implementation of the GDPR in 2018 (CNIL Activity Report 2020). The French data
protection agency has celebrated this continued use of the GDPR by the French citizenry,
as it demonstrates the integration of the right to be forgotten into the French legal
doctrine as an important right.
Criminal Records and the Right to Be Forgotten
Given the importance of the new digital privacy rights under the GDPR, the issue
of weighing the right to privacy against the broader public’s right to freedom of
expression calls into question the fundamental role of the right to be forgotten. Criminal
records represent one major area instance where an individuals’ right to be delisted
challenges notions of information that should be available to the public.
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Often, individuals who have been convicted of a crime become unwilling
participants in the news media, flung into the public eye by virtue of their crimes.
Although their crimes may attract public attention, the legislation in the GDPR allows for
delisting of unsavory past convictions and links to news stories since these convictions
may not be serving a “newsworthy, journalistic, or literary purpose” within the public
domain, especially considering a time-expiration component of information becoming
outdated over time (Faisal 2021, 8). So long as an individual no longer retains relevance
to the public, the information can be delisted. Individuals’ reputations could be
jeopardized by information freely circulating online, so the enforcement of the right to be
forgotten also serves to ensure that an individual can move beyond their transgressions.
Publication of a person’s criminal record, or allusions to their past history of
wrongdoing in newspapers, could also crush the “embryo” of socialization that many exoffenders need in order to regain social capital and rebuild their lives (Herzog-Evans
2011, 7). Legislators in France recognize that community plays a monumental role in
criminal justice spheres, with that role being a boon to an individual’s reentry into
society, where the smallest shred of prosocial activity must be honored and encouraged to
grow. Thus, the EU’s right to be forgotten chooses a higher standard for information to
remain in the public interest; rather than focusing on “whether a piece of information was
right or wrong, the EU’s legal system draws focus to whether the processor of the data
has the right to reveal the information or not” (Faisal 2021, 9). The truthfulness of the
past conviction plays no role in determining whether to publish information against an
individual’s wishes to keep it private. The only exception to this privacy regarding
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criminal records comes into play if an individual chooses to work in roles that require
particular sensitivity, or interaction with children, for example. Thus, the data processor
has a right to reveal information about past wrongdoing only if an individual continues to
seek high-trust positions, for example, or wishes to continue working with vulnerable
populations, and if their conviction is related to their post-conviction current
circumstances. Faisal (2021) offers the case of a teacher who abused their post in order to
commit fraud, and after serving their punishment, attempted to return to work in a school
as an entry-level employee (Ibid. 8). This individual would have a much harder time
seeking delisting from search engines than an individual who returned to a quieter life
further from the public eye. In accordance with this weighing of the public interest in an
individual’s past criminal convictions, the GDPR adopted Article 10, which allows for
the delisting of information related to an individual’s criminal past, and returns the
control of criminal convictions to the relevant authorities of the Member States (Art. 10
GDPR). This ensures that the GDPR exhibits concordance with the existing Criminal
Code of a country and allows for an individual to effectively move beyond histories of
transgression and to regain society’s good graces.
The right to be forgotten, then, is as much about weighing the public’s right to
know information about an individual as it is about protecting citizens’ right to privacy
online. Rather than inventing law, the right to be forgotten derives from the EU’s
individual right to privacy that predated the digital age. In allowing for technological and
legal adaptations around privacy, France and the EU assert that the right to be forgotten
serves a “fundamental need of an individual to determine the development of his life in
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an autonomous way, without being perpetually or periodically stigmatized as a
consequence of a specific action performed in the past, especially when these events
occurred many years ago” (Mantelero 2013, 2). While prior to the internet’s existence,
individuals could experience reputational damage through private information being
made public, digital spaces greatly expands the circulation and permanence of
information, so forgetting and moving beyond transgression can become nearly
impossible. Thus, courts and the legislature in France—already familiar with striking the
balance between the public’s right to know and the individual’s right to privacy—created
an ability to allow for selective, yet intentional, forgetting of personal information. The
only new factor initiated by the right to be forgotten is to extend existing laws into the
digital sphere.
Second, these processes of information removal occur in tandem with existing
policies towards expungement in France. One could go through the ritual of judicial
rehabilitation before the advent of the internet, certifying to the courts and their
community that they are rehabilitated (Maruna 2011, 102). However, this ritual would
ring hollow if an individual’s entire history of wrongdoing were accessible in news
articles, and the mechanisms of expungement would not deliver on their promises to
recertify an individual of their former status in society. Thus, the right to be forgotten
works together with existing criminal justice reforms to allow individuals to actually
allow an individual to move beyond one’s transgression.
This section on France demonstrates how the right to privacy became a
foundational, well-protected tenet under French law under Article 9 of the Civil Code,
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and later across the whole European Union with Article 8 of the Fundamental Charter on
Human Rights. Despite this origin of privacy as a personality right in the judicial system,
the right to personhood traces back to the fundamental provisions of rights in the
Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen, written in 1789. Because the right to
privacy applies to all citizens under the law, both celebrities and people who have
committed criminal offenses are still constitutionally granted the right to privacy. This
universal protection of privacy allows for the law to deliver on forgiveness and forgetting
of an individual’s past, such that society need not carry the mantle of punishment far
beyond an individual’s transgressions. Likewise, the right to privacy has become even
more entrenched into French law in the digital age. Given this early adoption of a right to
privacy in France, the combination of judicial decisions and legislation allowed for a
more streamlined translation of the right to privacy into the digital realm.
Section IV: The United States, Three Privacies in U.S. Jurisprudence
While the right to be forgotten passed as EU law with the ratification of the
General Data Protection Regulation in 2018, there have been no federal laws—and little
action on the state level—around the right to digital privacy. Why hasn’t the ‘right to be
forgotten’ taken root in the United States, and does it matter whether individuals have a
right to control information about themselves? Given the potential personality-building
components of privacy, the far-reaching consequences of abundant information, and the
compounded barriers to rehabilitation for formerly incarcerated individuals and
individuals with records, the United States’ approach to privacy merits discussion, as do
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the harms of the continued lack of legislation on matters of privacy. The United States
has neglected to explore online privacy reforms in both civil and criminal contexts.
Following the creation of the right to be forgotten in the European Union in 2014,
and the codification of the right to delete in the 2018 General Data Protection Regulation
(GDPR), scholars, news outlets, and jurists in the United States approached the issue of
digital privacy with varied degrees of enthusiasm. While one camp favors free speech and
freedom of expression, decrying the right to delete as media censorship, others noted how
the right to be forgotten in Europe could potentially pave the way for a similar right in the
United States, albeit one that factors in different legal and social norms around privacy
and data. However, due to the First Amendment right to freedom of expression, as well as
countless precedent-setting court cases, unified digital-privacy measures face
increasingly unfriendly conditions in the United States. To understand the steps taken
thus far by the United States to address the issues of digital privacy, one must first begin
with the history of the right to privacy in the U.S. more broadly. This section will outline
the common law baseline of the United States, our relevant legal history of the right to
privacy, existing norms around privacy in the United States, and the fragmented legal
environment around privacy in the digital age.
Three Privacies in U.S. Jurisprudence
The idea that the common law can be rapidly altered, and the sense that it allowed
for flexibility in unforeseen circumstances, is one that appealed to early developers of
U.S. privacy theory. Warren and Brandeis attempted to build a civil right to privacy out
of reputational harm, which ultimately proved to be an unsuccessful legal argument.
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Likewise, William Prosser returned to the privacy tort in his 1960 Privacy article, which
has since become widely accepted as the doctrine of civil liability for privacy. A
confusing judicial landscape, coupled with narrowly defined privacy rights in certain
domains (healthcare, education, etc.), has prevented the development of a comprehensive
right to privacy in the United States, instead allowing a multivalent understanding of
privacy to develop. Moving into the digital age, privacy protections for U.S. computer
users have stagnated, and the federal government has largely left states to dictate digital
privacy laws for themselves.
In contrast to the construction of privacy in France, where privacy directly
encourages the development of an individual's personality, the United States has seen a
lackluster embrace of privacy as a fundamental right of the person. Compared to the
streamlined approach in France, which anchors privacy in a person’s fundamental liberty
to do anything that does not cause harm to another person under the Declaration of the
Rights of Man, the United States’ foundational legal doctrine leads to a heavily
fragmented legal environment for the right to privacy. Fourth Amendment protections for
the “right to be secure in one’s persons, houses, papers, and effects” have been
thoroughly developed through Katz v. United States, Griswold v. Connecticut, and even
Roe v. Wade, to protect citizens from governmental intrusion (U.S. Constitution, Fourth
Amendment). However, this same standard protecting against invasions of privacy is less
developed in civil liability cases. The Supreme Court, in its “people, not places” creation
of a reasonable expectation of privacy, simultaneously upheld that U.S. citizens have no
general Constitutional right to privacy. Thus, the right to privacy has been bifurcated into
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separate issues depending on whether the matter concerns civil versus criminal cases.
Likewise, statutory protections exist for limited rights to privacy in select circumstances
where the government has been able to regulate certain industries. The Privacy Act of
1974 controls how governmental agencies process personal information, the Fair Credit
Reporting Act (FRCA) allows for the intentional forgetting of past credit violations to
allow individuals another attempt at economic gains, FERPA (the Family Educational
Rights and Privacy Act) protects the privacy of students and their educational records,
HIPAA (the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act) developed protection
for patient’s health records, and COPPA (the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Rule)
monitors websites that are directed towards children aged 13 or younger.
Yet, despite all of these statutes that either directly address citizen’s privacy or
allude to the need for privacy rights in certain circumstances, the right to privacy in the
United States has remained separated into the two categories of criminal and civil
liability. Namely, individuals have a right to privacy in criminal matters to protect from
incrimination of an individual from searches performed by the government, and a much
lesser privacy right in the civil context. Why hasn’t the United States embraced a unified
right to privacy, and where do the relevant constructions of privacy in the United States
originate? In this section, I will argue that the multimodal construction of privacy in the
United States has created gaps in a unified understanding, and legally protected version,
of privacy.
Common Law Underpinnings of Privacy
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Following the Enlightenment ideals originating out of Europe, U.S. philosophers
and political theorists similarly interrogated the relationship between propertied men and
the government, and the natural, irrevocable rights granted to all people by virtue of
being human. These “natural rights” became foundational tenets that the new U.S.
government aimed to protect. Namely, the United States defined a limited government,
tasked with protecting an individual’s access to “life, liberty, and pursuit of happiness”
(U.S. Declaration of Independence). In addition, the U.S. Constitution expanded the basic
civil rights and liberties of the U.S. citizenry in similar fashion: government, particularly
at the federal level, was seen as an antagonistic obstacle to the free flourishing of
individuals.
Antagonism against the government can be seen in the negative construction of
rights within the Bill of Rights, the ten foundational civil rights embodied in the first
iteration of the Constitution. In the First Amendment, the rights to freedom of expression,
speech, and press were laid out: “Congress shall make no law...prohibiting the free
exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press etc.” (U.S.
Constitution). In the U.S. context, the writers of the Constitution feared the abuses and
overreach of government into individuals’ personal lives. Rather than viewing the
government as a potential guarantor of rights, the U.S. government served as the biggest
threat to an individual’s ability to engage in self-determinative activity, such as freely
expressing one’s thoughts to the public, engaging in protest or redress, or protecting
one’s own home from intrusions from government.
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Given the limited civil liberties in the Bill of Rights, no single defined right to
privacy exists for U.S. citizens and residents. Rather, the right to privacy has been
constructed in bits and pieces of legal decisions, outlining the physical boundaries to
which one’s sanctity of space, body, and mind extends; often, the judicial interpretation
of cases becomes decided entirely against an individual’s right to privacy. The right most
approximate to privacy occurs in the Fourth Amendment’s right to property, protecting
against “unreasonable searches and seizures,” and being “secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects” (Fourth Amendment, U.S. Constitution). Yet neither statutes nor
Constitutional guarantees mention any protection for privacy; while the legal
interpretation of the Fourth Amendment’s right to privacy demonstrates a commitment to
preserving one’s privacy when it pertains to physical property inside one’s home, this
right does not extend to one’s image or other characteristic components of identity.
The limited rights laid out by the U.S. Constitution reflect the legal design of
many common-law countries. Legislators in the United States derive statutes, however,
the Constitution has formed the legal backing for the creation of most legislation and case
law precedent in the United States. Rather than articulating an entire civil code for every
foreseeable right and need of its citizenry, common law frameworks rely on
“development of law by a system of judicial precedent,” such that all written laws derive
their legitimacy from successfully being argued in the courts (Stone 1936, 5). Common
law countries, therefore, attempt to assure that laws at local, state, and federal levels
exhibit concordance with the Constitution. This process within common law countries,
known as judicial review, has granted the courts the ability to “not only interpret, but
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make the law” (Holland 1988, 21). In comparison to civil-law countries, the flow of
legislation in common law countries is a much more involved process. Constructing laws
relies first on the forming of legislation in the legislative branch, then moves on to the
courts to engage in policy approval and demanding enforcement of legislation, while civil
law countries need only pass Parliament for laws to join the main body of law in a
country (with some exceptions around similar mechanisms of judicial approval).
However, the common law system does not create law in a vacuum. Rather, every
judicial interpretation derives legitimacy in each ruling from a commitment to upholding
existing legal precedent. While this does create conditions where the law is slightly
imprecise and may not be perfectly applicable to new circumstances, connecting the
current law to past law creates a trail of legal thought that allows interpretations to derive
legitimacy from what came before. The process of judicial review, then, allows for reimagining of old laws into new circumstances, so the law can potentially become more
adaptable to the unknown.
Warren and Brandeis: An Unsuccessful Argument for Privacy
The adaptability of the common law may exist more in theory than in practice.
While Warren and Brandeis praise the “eternal youth” of the common law, Palmer and
other legal historians argue for the much more “glacial” course of the common law to
effect change slowly, rather than with sudden creations of new rights (Warren and
Brandeis 1890, 195 & Palmer 2011, 79). Still, early ruminations on a right to privacy in
the United States have drawn on this potential for flexibility of the common law to deal
with unforeseen circumstances in light of continuing advancement and pace of
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technological gains. In 1890, Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis co-authored a privacy
tort “On The Right to Privacy.” They aimed to clarify the legal and Constitutional basis
for protecting a right to privacy, and they provide a pathway for a “right to be let alone”
that is very in-line with contemporary European standards of privacy.
The “beautiful capacity for growth which characterizes the common law” inspired
Warren and Brandeis to imagine rapid evolution of a new right to the un-litigated frontier
of personality and privacy (Warren and Brandeis 1890, 135). Since existing U.S.
Constitutional protections and statutes failed to anticipate the increasing intrusions upon
privacy, Warren and Brandeis imagined the common law of the United States to be
expandable to encapsulate new personality rights. Similar to how the Rachel Decision in
France connected an individual’s right to privacy to the sanctity of privacy as a
personality-building domain, Warren and Brandeis address the “tangible and intangible”
components of property to fully define privacy as a necessary component of an
individual’s personality rights (Ibid. 194).
Privacy was as much a protection of one’s physical space against unwanted
intrusions as it was protecting one’s ability to freely think and develop one’s “sensations
and intense intellectual and emotional life,” free from the prying eyes of media,
government, or other citizens (Ibid. 195).
While the actions of individuals in the public eye (as celebrities, politicians, and
other public figures are) can sometimes blend the distinctions between “newsworthy”
information and tabloid speculation, the fundamental premise of the Warren and Brandeis
tort is to argue that when an invasion of privacy occurs, an individual has the civil right to
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pursue emotional damages. Protecting true, yet highly personal information from media
sensationalization rests on the “damage to reputation,” one’s public image and
interpersonal relationships become jeopardized by virtue of having private information
made public (Ibid. 197). Drawing on a similar logic of reputation and honor that was
becoming popular abroad, Warren and Brandeis argue that the emotional harms caused
by publishing private information has a legal basis in historical systems of honor that
have protected an individual against slights upon their character. Warren and Brandeis
draw the right to privacy, beyond property and copyright law, to protect the essence of
the individual to express thoughts without fear of encroachment.
For mapping out the boundaries of a right to privacy, Warren and Brandeis offer
the idea of property as a better legal basis for privacy. Despite similarities to existing
copyright law that protects creative works, Warren and Brandeis discussed how private
writings, letters, drawings, or other personal musings do not fall under copyright law,
since there would be no intent to publish. When private material becomes published
without the consent of the author, Warren and Brandeis point to the creation of
personhood as an intangible component of property as the basis for redress. Included in
their definition of property, both physical space and intangible components of personality
come together to form “the principle which protects personal writings and all other
personal productions, not against theft and physical appropriation, but against publication
in any form, is in reality not the principle of private property, but that of an inviolate
personality” (Ibid. 205). Privacy forms an intangible component of personhood,
extending beyond one’s home or physical space to one’s thoughts and feelings.
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While Warren and Brandeis lay out this argument for privacy as a personality
right and as intangible property, their argument also acknowledges that the right to
privacy is not an absolute. Often, the right to privacy will conflict with the public’s right
to know. In order to classify what constitutes an “invasion of privacy,” Warren and
Brandeis created a six-part qualification scheme to attempt to balance the right to privacy
of the individual against the right of the community to be informed. These stipulations
include a narrower right to privacy for public figures; the right of an aggrieved party to
respond; privacy protections for written or visual sources, but not oral sources; the
abdication of privacy rights for information published by oneself; having truth be
unimportant if privacy is violated; and lastly, the role of malicious intent in publishing
damaging information. In each of these arguments, Warren and Brandeis justify the right
to privacy relative to the existing social conditions and the rights of others to know
information about us in select circumstances. Thus, their checks on privacy aim to make
freedom of speech a relative right, and for privacy concerns to tip the scales away from
disclosure of private facts.
The first of Warren and Brandeis’ six stipulations argues for the weighing of
privacy against the relative celebrity of the individual, and whether they have “renounced
the right to live their lives screened from public observation”—for example, candidates
for public office (Warren and Brandeis). Even then, privacy still does extend narrowly to
people within the public eye; while public officials lose much of their right to privacy by
virtue of existing and working in the public sphere, these officials are entitled to the
privacy of past information, such that their entire pasts or intimate lives are not trawled

59
and laid bare for public inspection. Two, the right to privacy of an individual does not
trump another’s right to seek reparations for attacks on their character. Warren and
Brandeis argue, an individual would be able to publish the vindicating parts of another’s
speech to clear their reputation and provide evidence for damages. Three, Warren and
Brandeis discuss the difference between invasions of privacy in speech and in oral
statements. Slander, or oral defamation, they assert, would not be granted the same
protection as invasions of privacy in media or print sources. Since oral defamation or
other gossip used to not persist through time or spread beyond a local area, they did not
hold the same potential for personality damages or harms to reputation as print sources.
Fourth, the right to privacy of an individual vanishes when an individual publishes
information about themselves. Fifth, the truthfulness of a publication plays no role in the
validity of its publication; the disclosure of true, private information (also called private
facts) carries the same invasive harms that false speech does. Lastly, Warren and
Brandeis argue that the absence of willful, malicious intent cannot serve as a defense for
the media invading people’s privacy. That is, the implied or expressed intent of a
publisher to do no harm does not serve as a defense against emotional damage inflicted
by privacy invasions. Thus, these six qualifications on the right to privacy were designed
to combat flagrant violations of one’s private life for the sake of a good story or salacious
gossip, but to leave room for truthful facts to be disclosed in the public interest.
While the Warren and Brandeis tort envisions a solid foundational right to privacy
in the common law framework of the United States, their privacy tort falls short when
framed by current standards of media access and informational availability through the
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internet. Warren and Brandeis opened up the discussion on the flexibility of the common
law in new circumstances, yet even in recognizing the pace of change in a growing
democracy, their envisioned right to privacy has not held up to evolving social
conditions. Namely, the requirement that “oral publication” of material not be granted the
same privacy protections as written publications reflects a much more insular society than
we now know today. While Warren and Brandeis believed that in-person oral gossip
would not spread beyond a small community, new technologies make possible the global
dissemination of oral information. In the 1890’s, Warren and Brandeis worried about the
advent of the camera to capture revealing images of an individual’s personal life, and in
the 1960s, William Prosser objected to the oral publication of information in the age of
radio, when radio “made written or printed information” obsolete (Prosser 1960, 394).
And today, the risks of private information disclosures can occur through television,
internet, and the myriad social media platforms that operate in the 21st century.
Secondly, the absence of privacy provided to information an individual discloses
themselves reveals an unforeseen obstacle in the permanence of news and information
today. Warren and Brandeis believed that information published by an individual could
no longer be granted privacy protections; however, the reach and permanence of
information in the digital age reflects how an individual can entirely lose control over
everything from their own “likeness” to deeply personal information through the
information circulating on the internet. Amy Gajda describes a relatable case where actor
Hulk Hogan posted a photograph, only to later regret and delete it, but not before it made
the rounds on Twitter. This looks towards the entire generation raised in the era of social
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media dominance, who are all “publishers of Twitter, Instagram, Snapchat, and
Facebook” with the potential to cause irreparable harm to themselves and other “internet
bloggers” (Gajda 2015, 250). Given the ability for people to post potentially regrettable
information with such permanent footprints, the loss of privacy rights to individuals upon
publishing such information reflects a permanent relinquishing of control of one’s own
information that Warren and Brandeis could not have imagined.
Alternate Constructions of Tort Privacy
Although Warren and Brandeis created the initial outline for the right to privacy
in the United States, much of their initial argument appeals to the moral side of
personhood, rather than legal technicalities of inserting a right to privacy within the
existing Constitutional framework. Their ‘right to be let alone’ entered into a decadeslong battle with the courts that have continued to test the flexibility of common law and
the power of judicial precedents around matters of privacy. However, since their
argument in 1890, the harms caused by invasions of privacy remained largely beyond the
purview of the Supreme Court and legislators, and any legal challenges upholding
privacy have largely been unsuccessful.
Privacy and personality rights, in the Warren and Brandeis construction, did not
have a clear enough attachment to existing Constitutional rights. In fact, since their tort,
privacy protections have usually been denied across all levels of the court, where
freedoms of the press have trumped an individual’s privacy.
One tort, however, has been successfully integrated in a number of cases outlining
the bounds of privacy. William Prosser, in an attempt to consolidate the right to privacy
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imagined by Warren and Brandeis, wrote the 1960 “Privacy” tort, arguing that privacy is
not one single tort, but rather a “complex of four” different rights to provide legal redress
to individuals who have had their privacy violated. These four qualifiers of privacy are
the intrusion into one’s personal life; public disclosure of embarrassing private facts
(intrusion upon seclusion); publicity which misrepresents an individual (false light); and
the appropriation of an individual’s name or likeness (Prosser 1960, 389). In each of
these cases, Prosser argues, there is some grievous harm done to the individual, a harm
that is deserving of emotional or mental damages recoverable under the law.
Prosser offers the following case in favor of the privacy protections for intrusions
of privacy, even when the basic facts of the case are true. In the 1931 California court
case of Melvin v. Reid, a woman had been a prostitute who was tried and acquitted for
murder. Years later, the woman remarried, went by her married name of Melvin, and
lived a peaceful life, where she purposefully distanced herself from her past. However, a
movie called “The Red Kimono'' exposed all of her past in this re-telling of the true
events, causing an undue personality harm “by revealing her past to the world and her
friends,” so she sued for an invasion of privacy (Ibid. 392). The California Appellate
Court acknowledged the spotty record of the right to privacy in the courts, and that most
successful cases rest on “breach of contract,” or that some fit neatly under the “law of
libel without invoking the doctrine of the right of privacy” (Court of Appeals, Fourth
District 112 Cal. App. 285, Cal. Ct. App. 1931). The court agreed that Melvin had
suffered a grievous invasion and personality harm. Though the original common law did
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not define a right to privacy, the court rested its decision on the violation of Melvin’s
right to pursue happiness, a right protected under the California Constitution.
This reflects similar logic regarding the right to privacy in the Rachel decision in
France: a real photograph caused extreme emotional duress for a family, resulting in the
need for an injunction of the image and financial reparations. The truth of the information
played little role in the decision for the broad disclosure of her old life. Rather, the
important legal opinions to come out of the Melvin decision in the California District
Court were that a) Melvin had, in the years since the trial, made every effort to distance
herself from her past life, and b) that the right of the public to know certain information is
not absolute, and that the limits on the freedom of expression must at least consider the
potential effects on a person’s privacy.
In addition to Prosser’s portrayal of the Melvin decision to exemplify how truth
cannot be a defense to invasions of private facts, his treatise on privacy draws another
limit on expectations of privacy: looking at the relative status of the individual making
the claim to privacy. In particular, Prosser draws the reader’s attention to people in the
public eye. Prosser asserts that the press “has a privilege, guaranteed by the Constitution,
to inform the public about those who have become legitimate matters of public interest,”
an interest that very often can oppose an individual’s privacy (Ibid. 411). Given the
potential “newsworthiness” of an individual’s private life, Prosser doubles down on the
idea that celebrities, public figures, and government officials—as well as “public figures
for a season”— do not maintain the same basic rights to privacy as the common person,
yet they still deserve of privacy in intimate moments with no relevance to their public
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personality (Ibid. 413). Prosser tempers the right to privacy of the individual against the
public’s right to know.
While Prosser’s main goal was to propose a classification scheme for privacy, and
to provide order to roughly 80 years where privacy languished in an inhospitable court
system, the end result has been that Prosser’s envisioning of privacy as a multi-part civil
protection has been neglected in post-1960 court decisions. Although privacy as a
protection for personhood has become more firmly introduced into legal and social
vernacular, the Supreme Court has largely rejected Prosser’s construction of a distinct
right to privacy in balancing the right to privacy with the public’s right to know.
Evolving Standards of Newsworthiness
In a strict departure from Prosser’s standards of privacy under the civil liability
tort, court cases with connection to the media have been overwhelmingly decided in favor
of the free press. Highlighting the power of First Amendment rights to freedom of the
press in the United States, privacy of the individual holds little weight against the public
interest, with one Oregon court stating that “a review of cases since 1967 had shown ‘no
reported case in which a plaintiff successfully recovered damages for truthful disclosure
by the press’” (Gajda 2015, 45). The theoretical rights to privacy through tort law,
envisioned first by Warren and Brandeis and later by Prosser, ran into the barrier of the
First Amendment.
One case that demonstrates the strength of First Amendment claims is that of New
York Times v. Sullivan (1964). The New York Times had run an ad soliciting donations for
Martin Luther King Jr., who was being held in Alabama on perjury charges. L.B.
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Sullivan, the city’s Public Safety Commissioner, claimed that the ad misrepresented him
and the Montgomery Police Department with factual inaccuracies, and he asked for a
retraction of the ad. The Times refused, and Sullivan sued for libel, winning damages in a
lower court. However, in a unanimous Supreme Court decision, the justices overturned
the lower court’s precedent in favor of the Times on First Amendment grounds, arguing
that removing this ad would violate freedom of the press. Newspapers reliant on free
speech worried that the ability to claim defamation, or any privacy protections, for public
officials would suppress the watchdog functions of the media on government, and that it
would provide public officials with an opportunity to legally fight criticism or allegations
of abuses of power (Abrams 2021). In deciding the Sullivan case, the Supreme Court
removed privacy protections and raised the bar considerably for successful defamation
suits brought by people in the public eye. Thus, a new standard of defamation was
developed in Justice Brennan’s unanimously supported opinion, where individuals would
have to prove “actual malice” of the publisher of defamatory information or libel, such
that the publisher intended to cause emotional harm or otherwise damage an individual’s
reputation.
The decision in Sullivan reflects the attempts by the court to preserve freedom of
expression for newsworthy information; however, it also reflects a massive obstacle to
the principles of a right to privacy outside of a criminal context. In contrast to the
decisions in support of a narrow right to privacy under the Fourth Amendment,
defamation and civil liability for publishing information about another’s personal life do
not have the same considerations for privacy. The precedent set by Sullivan has led the
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Supreme Court to apply these principles of a ‘newsworthiness standard,’ one that
recognizes all manners of personal information as potentially important inclusions into
the public record. That is, the “fear of a chilling effect” on a free media “has led the Court
to protect even undesirable speech” (Zimmerman 1982, 383). This can be seen in the
1967 case of Time v. Hill, where James Hill and his family were denied damages in
defamation suits because they could not prove that the publisher, Life magazine, had
acted with “actual malice.” This case created an expansion of the precedent in Sullivan;
the higher threshold for public figures now applied to people tangentially in the public
eye.
The Hill family were considered private individuals, until their unfortunate
tragedy of being kidnapped at gunpoint had been elevated to “newsworthy” again through
a play written about it; that is, they became public figures “for a season,” to borrow from
Prosser’s language on temporary celebrity status (Prosser 1960, 413). In these instances
defined by the Supreme Court, the information contains points of departure from the truth
or otherwise misrepresents reality, yet the standard for people who have risen to the
public eye in some form or another can lose all ability to seek damages. The ‘relative
public figure’ status has been extended to almost all manners of defamation cases, from
instances where news media publish the names of living rape victims, as in Florida Star
v. B.J.F. (1989), or the sexuality of an active bystander who saved the life of a U.S.
president, as in Sipple v. Chronicle Publishing Co. (1984). The standards for proving
defamation are extraordinarily high, and “protection of rape victims, like protection of
juvenile offenders, then, seemingly fail to reach that extraordinary threshold” that
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governs the public disclosure of private facts (Gajda 2015, 35). That is, highly sensitive
pieces of personal information can be aired in the public domain, regardless of damaging
personal revelations.
However, these cases reflect a constant challenge in weighing the relevant
“newsworthiness” of a story against the media’s right to freedom of expression. As soon
as a story becomes written and published, it becomes part of the public domain, and thus
worthy of press coverage. In this circular logic, “whatever is in the news media is by
definition newsworthy” and thus deserves First Amendment protections (Kalven 1967,
336). This trend towards total eclipses of the tort invasion of privacy predates Sullivan,
and it can also be seen in Sidis v. FR Pub. Corporation (1938). Sidis was a prodigious
child mathematician who achieved early celebrity status, yet whose subjection to the
abuses of paparazzi and media invasion caused him to retreat entirely from the public
eye, aiming to live a life of solitude. However, The New Yorker magazine published a
story on child prodigies and their life trajectories, interviewing Sidis and others,
subjecting him once again to the public consciousness. Sidis sued for libel and invasion
of privacy against the magazine; however, he also claimed a “tort action for invasion of
privacy by publication of embarrassing private facts,” an argument built on the common
law case precedents that existed in a handful of other states where the magazine had been
sold (Barbas 2013, 34). Shutting down this argument for the invasions of privacy and the
associated “emotional damages,” the U.S. District Court of New York ruled that, by
virtue of Sidis’ youthful status as a celebrity, the magazine was free to publish all insights
into his adult life. The New Yorker’s argument reflects similar circular logic, whereby an
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individual featured in a story must thus be considered newsworthy. The Sidis case reflects
how the scales are weighted towards expression, even to the extent of turning “personal
humiliation into an object of mass consumption” (Barbas 2012, 26). In contrast to earlier
state court decisions, the New York District Court came to an entirely different
conclusion around the public interest than the California appeals court in Melvin. Melvin
was able to seek emotional damages for the dredging up of her past life, whereas Sidis’
past life as a celebrity became a justification for the continued invasion of privacy well
into his new life of anonymity. This ultimately unsuccessful case demonstrates how the
circular logic of “public interest” upholds the right to freedom of expression, ultimately
resulting in the resounding defeat of civil claims upon a right to privacy.
Civil Liability versus Criminal Protections of Privacy
Although the Supreme Court has insisted on the public’s right to know, the right
to privacy has seen considerable protection in a criminal context, as a freedom from
invasions of the government. In order to interrogate court challenges of privacy, the
Olmstead case offers a glimpse into the challenge of adding privacy to the list of
Constitutionally protected rights.
Three years before Prosser’s exemplary privacy case of Melvin v. Reid reached
the California appellate court as a “win” for privacy as a civil liability case, the Supreme
Court heard the 1928 case Olmstead v. United States, where federal agents installed a
wiretap into a person’s home and office building in an effort to uncover criminal
bootlegging. Olmstead argued that his Fourth Amendment rights against “unreasonable
search and seizure” were violated with these wiretaps; even though the federal agents did
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not physically invade his property in search of evidence. In a condemnation of the right to
privacy, the Supreme Court asserted that the individual did not have Fourth Amendment
protections to private phone calls, since there was no physical invasion of “property,
personal effects, or papers” (Fourth Amendment). In the majority opinion, the facts of the
case rested on whether the Fourth Amendment protects against invasions of privacy that
do not cross a physical threshold, and the Court upheld that physical entry is required for
invasions of privacy to occur.
While the Olmstead case rested on the Fourth Amendment right to privacy—as it
pertained to unwarranted searches of physical property—both Warren and Brandeis’ and
Prosser’s privacy torts embody the kind of connection to privacy as an intangible right
deserving of protection, regardless of physical location. Prosser’s key amendment to
existing rules on privacy asked whether the invasion of privacy would be “offensive or
objectionable to a reasonable man” (Prosser 1960, 391).
Whereas privacy was not recognized by the Supreme Court as a right of U.S.
citizens until the mid-1960s, the new right to privacy in the United States reflects
language that mirrors Prosser’s understanding of privacy. In examining the right to
privacy in the criminal context anew, the Supreme Court heard a challenge to the
Olmstead precedent in the 1967 case Katz v. United States. Katz was taking a phone call
in a public phone booth that federal agents had altered with a listening device. Phone
calls that police had listened to were admitted as evidence of Katz’s illegal activity,
making Katz an almost-identical case to the Olmstead case. Drawing from the wealth of
privacy scholarship in the preceding years, the Supreme Court reversed its original
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decision in Olmstead to acknowledge that wiretapping did infringe upon an individual’s
reasonable expectation of privacy. In the majority opinion, Justice Potter Stewart wrote
that the Fourth Amendment protects “people, not places,” and asserted that the Fourth
Amendment is actually a protection of privacy as it attaches to an individual.
Katz reflects an acknowledgment by the Supreme Court of an instance which
demonstrates a partial ability for the common law to adapt in changing times and new
technology. Thus, the cases which have successfully paved the way for privacy have been
defined using criminal liability and the aftereffects of invasion of privacy. In contrast to
the lofty language around “dignity and reputation” exhortations that emerge from Warren
and Brandeis, the language used in Katz explicitly connects to existing rights in the
Constitution in order to create a solid foundation for overturning the existing precedent in
Olmstead, while also narrowing the legal definition of privacy. In addition to Justice
Stewart’s reinterpretation of existing precedent, Justice Harlan wrote an accompanying
decision that echoes the standard of reasonableness. Harlan’s accompanying decision
created a “reasonableness” test for determining invasions of privacy under the Fourth
Amendment, which exhibits concordance with Prosser’s scholarship on invasions of
privacy in the civil sphere. Justice Harlan’s two-part test for whether an individual’s
Constitutionally guaranteed, albeit conditional, right to privacy has been infringed upon
is a) whether an individual had an “actual, subjective expectation of privacy,” and b)
whether society at-large agrees and is “willing to recognize [that] as reasonable” (U.S.
Reports, 389 U.S. 347, 361). Given these two factors, Harlan’s qualification on a right to
privacy protected by the Fourth Amendment does narrow an individual’s right to privacy.
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Conversations in public or things in plain view are not granted the same level of privacy
protection as it would be for information that an individual has attempted to remove from
public view.
This standard of reasonable expectations of privacy has continued today,
extending privacy to the right of couples to use contraception (Griswold v. Connecticut,
1965) allowing abortions (Roe v. Wade, 1973), and prohibiting police from using thermal
imaging technology without suitable requirements of a search (Kyllo v. United States,
2001). Indeed, these court decisions have reversed prior rulings that deny people the right
to privacy within their homes and other private spaces.
Although the right to privacy in the courts has made leaps and bounds since the
first theories of privacy, justices have largely refrained from creating law in the courts.
Indeed, the way in which the courts have interpreted a right to privacy under the Fourth
Amendment demonstrates justice’s wariness to fully deliver any promise of widespread
privacy, and to shy away from balancing between privacy and First Amendment rights to
expression. This slow process of privacy within the U.S. common law can be seen with
how the “reasonableness standard” has been applied in successive court cases to allow
people to have privacy in their own homes, a lesser degree of privacy to vehicles, and
privacy in communication to others through phones and letters. Each new development
since Katz has required new court cases to develop the boundaries of the right to privacy
under the Fourth Amendment. Even as the Supreme Court overturned previous decisions
to guarantee an individual’s privacy, the court also expressly denounced a comprehensive
right to privacy, arguing that “the Fourth Amendment cannot be translated into a general
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constitutional ‘right to privacy.’” (389 U.S. 347, 350). Thus, each new Supreme Court
precedent narrowly etches out potential expansions of ‘reasonable’ areas of privacy.
These court cases mark where the right to privacy became somewhat pigeonholed
with the Katz decision. While the spirit of the law recognizes that the Fourth Amendment
has some inherent characteristics of privacy (“being secure in one’s person and effects,”
for example), the actual language of these monumental privacy decisions demonstrates
not a commitment to privacy, rather a commitment to reigning in the powers of the
government. In each Supreme Court case that supported the right to privacy—Griswold,
Katz, and Roe—the right to privacy is constructed as protecting privacy rights against
government intrusion; “the presence of government involvement in cases finding an
invasion of privacy, however, is a glaring common denominator that supports the
proposition that American privacy is understood as liberty from government” (Dowdell
2017, 330). Thus, because law enforcement plays an important role in the fundamental
facts of each case, the protection of privacy must involve some attempt by the
government to overreach a citizen’s Constitutionally protected Fourth Amendment right.
The right to privacy has experienced a mixed record of success when defined in
the civil, rather than criminal, context. In order to adapt to changing times, the Supreme
Court has seemed more sympathetic to arguments about invasions of privacy from the
government than invasions of privacy and damages of reputation by the press. However,
Congress and individual states have also explored the right to privacy in statutes for
approaching matters of protecting individual privacy in new informational realms.
Legislative Creations of Privacy
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In addition to the convoluted case law on privacy—where the jurisprudence
bifurcates into poorly-protected rights to privacy in terms of civil liability or tort law, and
comparatively-better protected rights from the invasions by the government—the
legislative construction of privacy reflects a similarly complex pathway. Rather than
acknowledging a unified right to privacy, federal and state governments have pursued
privacy in narrow circumstances, often only applying to specific industries or certain
kinds of information deemed more “sensitive'' than others. In particular, privacy has been
upheld for financial, educational, and health records, while the opposite is true for digital
privacy and online communications, as written in key federal statutes.
The origins of the legislative push for privacy began in 1973 with the Department
of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW), and is still being reworked today in 2022,
with the development of state laws around digital privacy and consumer protections
online. I will argue that the fragmented nature of the federal statutes around privacy do
not adequately address issues of digital privacy, nor do they adequately represent the
interests of people within the United States.
Beginning with the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW), the
federal bureaucracy began to view the potential for digital information and the advent of
new technologies to serve as both a boon to economic growth, as well as a risk for U.S.
consumers in terms of data processing. In 1973, HEW released a 193-page report titled
“Records, Computers and the Rights of Citizens: Report of the Secretary's Advisory
Committee on Automated Personal Data Systems.” Among other topics, this report
documented the various information that U.S. consumers may have to provide in these
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new online spaces, from potentially identifying themselves through Social Security
Numbers (SSNs) to the unnecessary storing of personal information about an individual.
A main theme underscoring all of the report was the need to legislate in light of the rapid
development of new technology relative to the slow formulation of law.
The law moving at a much slower pace than technology is one commonly
discussed by cyber ethicists. As James Moor puts it, “computer sprawl moves on many
fronts unsupervised, and the beginning of exponential growth in the field of computing
has effects which none of us can imagine, let alone predict,” meaning policy falls far
behind the technological advancements (Moor 2000, 35). The HEW Report, then, aimed
to fill this policy gap with concrete suggestions in order to allow for some semblance of
laws and regulations to protect consumers. Explicitly underlining the unnavigated terrain
of digital spaces, the HEW discussed how existing laws do not appropriately protect
privacy: “The natural evolution of existing law will not protect personal privacy from the
risks of computerized personal data systems” (HEW 1973, 47).
Addressing the potential risks for consumers’ digital information, the HEW
Report gave an overview of existing constructions of privacy in the United States,
particularly the ways in which ‘privacy’ in the U.S. vernacular has fallen short. Alluding
to existing jurisprudence from Katz v. United States on the reasonable expectations of
privacy under the Fourth Amendment, the HEW Report highlights the challenges faced in
reaching one single definition of privacy. Yet this bureaucratic agency, unlike Congress
and the Supreme Court, did not shy away from offering a potential definition for privacy,
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and one that recognizes the challenges of maintaining and balancing a right to privacy in
digital spaces. It defined privacy as follows:
An individual's personal privacy is directly affected by the kind of
disclosure and use made of identifiable information about him in a
record. A record containing information about an individual in
identifiable form must, therefore, be governed by procedures that afford
the individual a right to participate in deciding what the content of the
record will be, and what disclosure and use will be made of the
identifiable information in it. Any recording, disclosure, and use of
identifiable personal information not governed by such procedures must
be proscribed as an unfair information practice unless such recording,
disclosure or use is specifically authorized by law. (1973 HEW Report
pg. 49, emphasis added)
This rather liberal definition of privacy, relative to the narrowed understanding in
the judicial branch, informed the HEW’s recommendations to legislators to factor in
consumer privacy and information-sharing in new legislation. The HEW Report
demonstrated how privacy policy solutions would be shaped by the diagnoses of the risks
to privacy, such that Congress must step in to legislate a pathway for digital privacy
rights that aligns problems with solutions. Thus, based on its identification of the
problems privacy would face in the digital age, the HEW developed a highly structured
list of recommendations centered on a few main goals of protecting privacy online.
Among these key recommendations that the HEW delivered to legislators, the
bureau argued for the creation of an independent federal agency to regulate “any
automated personal data systems,” which refers to any large bodies, governmental
institutions, or private institutions which control considerable amounts of consumer data
containing identifiable information (HEW 1973, 50). Additionally, they called for the
creation of a five-part Code for “Fair Information Practice Principles” (FIPPs), which
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allows individuals to a) know what kind of information exists online, b) safeguard the
individual’s information against improper/unfair uses, and c) to create actual enforcement
mechanisms for invasions of privacy in digital spaces, which ranged from criminal to
civil liability as well as injunctive relief for improper circulation of one’s data, amongst
other steps to ensure data privacy (Ibid. 55). Thus, the HEW Report encouraged
government intervention into the realm of current technology and data use practices
through the coordinated Fair Information Practices in order to protect citizens’
information online.
While the intentions of the HEW Report were noble, the actual implementation of
their recommendations fell largely on deaf ears. Although Congress soon passed the 1974
Privacy Act in the wake of the HEW Report’s publication, the protections for consumers
were limited to the potential abuses of an individual’s privacy at the hands of the federal
government. Influenced by government surveillance during the Watergate scandal, the
1974 Privacy Act implemented the HEW Report’s original recommendations for FIPPs,
including the safeguarding against abuses by governmental agencies surrounding
personal information, and the rights of an individual to know and correct the type and
extent of information held about them by agencies. Legal scholars and politicians both
point to the adoption of the HEW Report’s recommendations in a few key places, such
that “Congress crafted a few industry-specific privacy statues, but left a large array of
data collection and use unregulated” (Solove and Hartzog 2014, 593). Thus, the initial
response to the 1973 HEW Report created the inklings of a right to privacy for U.S.
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citizens in moving into online spaces, but the actual transition from recommendations
into law failed to get off the ground.
The Privacy Act of 1974 responded to the growing social and governmental
awareness about the risks of personal information online and the additional concerns
brought up by the 1973 HEW Report. While the Privacy Act did establish some rights for
U.S. citizens’ data rights, the Act failed to incorporate the broader risks to individual
privacy posed by tech corporations, larger businesses, and “Peeping Toms” in virtual
spaces. However, another privacy statute, the Electronic Communications Privacy Act,
developed over a decade later and extended more rights to private communication into
the digital realm.
Interestingly, this successful privacy protection mirrors the rights of privacy
defined by the Supreme Court when hearing cases around criminal liability and privacy
from intrusions by the federal government. Indeed, the Electronic Communications
Privacy Act (ECPA, 1986) established protections for “greater or lesser” invasions of
privacy by other persons into an individual’s life, from wiretapping phone calls to reading
emails to poring over stored data. In this landmark legislation, individuals were granted
statutory protection from invasions of privacy by others within phone calls, email and
other digital communications (18 U.S. Code § 2511). Additionally, this statute defines the
protocols required by federal agents in order to procure warrants for wiretapping and
other digital surveillance, to ensure citizens retain Fourth Amendment rights against
unreasonable searches and seizures. So, while exceptions are made to public officers or
federal agencies (when appropriate warrants exist), the right to privacy established within
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the ECPA attempts to serve as a check on unwieldy federal agencies while
simultaneously extending greater protections into digital spaces for U.S. residents than
previously existed.
In addition to the ECPA, four other privacy statutes emerged to allow some
particularly vulnerable personal information to be protected through legislation. The Fair
Credit Reporting Act (FRCA, 1970), the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act
(FERPA, 1973), the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA, 1996),
and the Children's Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA, 1998) all demonstrate the
ways that the federal government has aimed to protect the privacy of U.S. citizens in
narrow ways.
However, these privacy acts mainly serve to enforce some semblance of
regulation around the potential risks for information. Yet, the obstacles to enforcement
for digital privacy protections, as in the Children's Online Privacy Protection Act
(COPPA), demonstrates how regulations online can often have easy workarounds,
making them virtually unenforceable. For example, while COPPA protects children up to
age 13 by requiring parental approval, websites and data controllers can circumvent this
law by not asking for their users’ age (Leta-Jones 2016, 67). Therefore, while these
narrowed rights to privacy do serve an essential function in protecting personally
identifiable information from prying eyes, they also do not form solid enough regulations
to ensure enforceability of privacy rights, particularly online.
However, at the same time that privacy statutes were being added to the federal
agenda, new legislation developments also sealed the fate for less-protected digital
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privacy rights. For example, Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act (CDA,
1996) grants online service providers near-full immunity from rules around invasions of
privacy online and publication of harmful information on their sites.
A Slow Rejection of the Right to Be Forgotten
Moving into the digital age, then, the right to digital privacy has faced a tough and
inhospitable environment in the United States. The development of a unified right to
privacy has failed to connect to existing civil rights within the Constitution and has
limited enforceability in statutes, both of which have led to the outright rejection of
widespread digital privacy for people in the United States. There is little legal baseline
for privacy in the United States to develop in line with EU standards, let alone the
standard of digital privacy as laid out by the GDPR. But the lack of digital privacy
developments in the United States still bears examination. In this section, I will argue that
the aforementioned fragmented approach to privacy, coupled with robust protections for
the freedom of expression and for internet service providers (ISPs) and the exemption of
data providers from Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act of 1996 (CDA),
form obstacles to the development of an American right to be forgotten.
In addition to the fragmented constructions of privacy found in both the U.S.
court system and in the legislature, other obstacles to a comprehensive right to digital
privacy, such as the EU’s right to be forgotten, come from one act of legislation in
particular. The 1996 CDA originally had the very legitimate aim of “preventing any
individuals from knowingly transmitting obscene content to minors,” protecting U.S.
children from being exposed to indecent communication and information online, in
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addition to preventing consumers from being harassed over telecommunication lines
(U.S. 47, Title V, Telecommunications Act).
However, this law also contained a seed of tech industry protections, whereby
digital providers were given certain immunity from noticing, removing, or
acknowledging unsavory or unsettling content on their services. Section 230 of the
Communications Decency Act declared internet service providers and other data
controllers exempt from the requirements of transmission of information: “No provider or
user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any
information provided by another information content provider” (47 U.S. Code § 230).
This stipulation allows internet service providers to be free of liability for any
information hosted on their sites. As Leta-Jones (2016) puts it, “Platforms and service
providers are considered simply conduits for content,” and U.S. law enforces no
responsibility for solely allowing access to content (Leta-Jones 2016, 66). This key
exemption for data service providers in the United States has created immense problems
around data removal. In Google Spain, the defining link in digital privacy in the EU—of
invoking the 1995 Data Protection Directive to request to remove information online—
occurred because Google was classified as a “data controller.” Meanwhile, in the United
States, tech companies are designated “intermediaries,” or entities that provide access to
information, but hold no control over publishing information. While the Communications
Decency Act was overturned in Reno v. ACLU (1997), where it was deemed to violate
First Amendment rights to freedom of speech due to “overly broad” definitions of what
constituted obscene material online, Section 230 has remained law, allowing publishing
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sites and internet service providers to avoid liability for all manners of information posted
on their sites.
Given these outsized protections for data processors, many third-party sites have
been able to claim immunity from the law by not defining themselves as creators of
information. Websites that host revenge porn and other “push-the-envelope” publications
that circulate critical information about others are able to declare themselves immune
since they define themselves as collectors and aggregators of information that solicit
content from individuals (Gajda 2015, 123). Thus, Section 230 of the Communications
Decency Act essentially holds no one accountable for the publication and continued
circulation of emotionally damaging information online.
In the realm of the right to be forgotten, prime examples of information available
for removal under the EU’s GDPR rules include search engine results, such as articles to
outdated news articles, or other notices that could appear online. However, under the
immunity provided by Section 230, “the U.S. is incredibly unlikely to obstruct
discoverability of personal information upon request,” and any form of right to be
forgotten-style measure of delisting information from search engines would be highly
improbable under the existing regulatory conditions (Leta-Jones 2016, 151). Any digital
privacy laws targeting search engines for cataloging truthful, but potentially
reputationally-damaging information, must address how CDA 230 insulates the data
providers that allow for uninhibited information circulation.
The theoretical limits of the right to digital privacy have been strained by the
preexisting faults in conceptions of privacy, and unfavorable legislation like Section 230
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has made it incredibly difficult to return power to consumers in the United States.
However, mounting concerns over Big Tech’s monopoly on private citizen’s data have
resulted in increased legislative, executive, and bureaucratic pressure to develop
comprehensive digital privacy rights for people in the United States.
Section 230 reflects the tipping of the pendulum towards internet service
providers, away from consumer protections. Before Section 230, rulings like those in
New York District Court’s Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe Inc. (1991) and Stratton Oakmont
v. Prodigy (1995) demonstrated that internet providers were punished when they
attempted to moderate online spaces; Prodigy faced liability for attempting to moderate
their website, while Compuserve was treated as a content library. Evidence of
moderation—filtering of people’s online discourse of posts online—became evidence of
liability for not catching every type of harmful content that went unnoticed by the content
moderators. However, the underlying assumption for Section 230 is that the legal
distinction between publishers and distributors of online information has become “a
proxy for conversation about the First Amendment,” (Stepanyuk 2022). That is, First
Amendment concerns around freedom of speech have not really been explored within the
internet environment, because Section 230 allows selective moderation by service
providers with no agreed-upon framework for moderation. Indeed, the precedent-setting
case of Zeran v. America Online (AOL) (1997) underscores this continued immunity,
where the Virginia District Court upheld that search engines were immune from tort
liability for posts and publications on their services. In the decision, the judges decided
that preserving the free market of the internet was more important than individual
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intrusions upon privacy, and Section 230 allows internet providers to avoid "the specter
of tort liability in an area of such prolific speech [the Internet] and the chilling effect” of
allowing checks on internet providers (Ziniti 2008, 587). Thus, the capitalist forces of the
internet and the power of Section 230 have led to the continued shutdown of civil liability
torts, defamation, and any other privacy-based litigation to fail due to the prospect for
growth of the internet.
Yet, even with an apparent preference for the free market of the internet, online
privacy has been explored within the U.S. bureaucracy, Congress, and other
governmental actors. From the HEW Report, which first described the unregulated
internet as a potential risk to U.S. citizens, to the 2012 Internet Policy Task Force under
the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), the U.S. government has expressed
numerous concerns about the fate of consumer privacy in digital spaces.
In this 2012 Report, “Consumer Data Privacy in a Networked World: A
Framework for Protecting Privacy and Promoting Innovation in the Global Digital
Economy,” the FCC released recommendations to Congress about expanding digital
privacy and consumer digital protection frameworks, in order to ensure equitable
interactions on the internet, and that U.S. consumers retain civil liberties online. The
largest takeaways from this report were a) the recommendation for a “Consumer Privacy
Bill of Rights,” and b) to meet a standard of “global interoperability” to allow for
reducing transaction costs between countries, and to provide for more uniform, agile
protections of online spaces as new technologies continue to develop (2012 FCC Report,
35-37). This report identified digital protections as an important new avenue of policy
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directions for the United States, not only to align with developing global standards of
privacy online, but to provide actual enforcement mechanisms to errant tech companies,
and to hold technology corporations responsible for violations of privacy online.
One of the main selling points of this report was the appeal to relevant
stakeholders. In addition to pushing the legislative agenda for the Consumer Privacy Bill
of Rights, the FCC also appealed to all varieties of corporate and advocacy groups who
would like to join in the process of “deliberating and adopting” the new codes of conduct
for privacy online (Ibid. 26). In contrast to the more adversarial approach to technology
corporations by the European Union’s GDPR, the U.S. government sees internet service
providers and tech companies as potential allies, and that protecting digital privacy online
is a point of common interest between the corporate interests and governmental
regulatory players.
The main innovation in this report is the suggestion that Congress create a
statutory Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights, based on the “Fair Information Practice
Principles” (FIPPs), which were developed by the Department of Health, Education, and
Welfare in its initial 1973 report. These statutory rights include the rights to individual
control about how companies are using data; transparency about use practices; respect for
the context that a consumer originally shared the data; security; time-limited collection;
and holding technology providers accountable for violating consumer rights (Ibid. 11-22).
The Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights aimed to use statutory avenues to fill gaps in
consumers’ right to privacy, and to use the might of the Federal Trade Commission
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(FTC) to encourage technology companies to participate in their own regulation in order
to extend some protections to U.S. consumers online.
While the report does lay out important steps to encourage self-regulation and
participation by internet service providers in the regulatory agenda, the FCC’s
recommendations also encourage internet consumers to practice mindful sharing of
information online. In acknowledging the risks and potential digital life cycle of
information that consumers can give out, the report also advises that “consumers take
responsibility for those decisions” about whether to post and circulate information (FCC
Report 2012, 13). Reflecting a similar outlook to the sharing of personal information as
that of Warren and Brandeis, the FCC’s report expresses that an individual who shares
information about themselves will lose the right to privacy and control over that
information, so the initial act of sharing information is a first-order control on
information privacy; an individual then bears responsibility for risks in online spaces and
for ensuring their own digital privacy.
With a renewed push for citizens’ privacy—data privacy in particular—the
Obama Administration’s FTC appeared to make digital privacy a priority in his second
term. Indeed, their reasoning for becoming enforcers of consumer privacy online
embraces a broad definition of privacy as both a tangible and intangible right, that
“privacy protects important personal interests. Not just freedom from identity theft,
financial loss, or other economic harms but also from concerns that intimate, personal
details could become grist for the mills of public embarrassment” (2016 Federal
Register). Solove and Hartzog argue that, due to these regulatory measures, “FTC privacy
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jurisprudence is the broadest and most influential regulating force on information privacy
in the United States—more so than nearly any privacy statute or common law tort”
(Solove and Hartzog 2014, 587). However, the legal push behind a right to privacy has
not been aligned with the policy recommendations of the FTC and the White House. A
version of the Consumer Privacy Protection Act was introduced in the Senate in 2015,
and again in 2019 with the Privacy Bill of Rights Act—both of which would have
mandated that all internet service providers abide by the Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights
and pre-existing FIPPs (S.1158 & S. 1214). However, this bill failed to go further than
the Senate Judiciary Committee, and Congress has yet to hear other developments on the
federal statutory level for consumer protections online.
Thus, internet privacy in the United States has largely been curbed in moving
from policy recommendations into statutory rights or other protections under law.
Following a similar trajectory to the right to privacy in the judicial system, the right to
digital privacy in the legislature faces steep barriers from existing laws around immunity
for service providers, and the inability, thus far, to translate regulatory interests into law.
Criminal Justice and the Impossibility of Forgetting
While the right to be forgotten could have monumental effects for the digital
privacy of everyday individuals, the potential benefits of digital privacy could be
particularly useful to people in the United States with histories of criminal records.
Lageson (2016, 2020) discusses how the collateral consequences from having an arrest
record, a criminal record, or any history of criminal sanctions can result in profound
political, social, and economic consequences for people in the United States. Moving into

87
the digital age, then, the online re-publication of records can be extremely damaging, and
can add insult to injury for people hoping to move beyond their past actions. Allowing
the default of remembering an individual’s missteps, in effect, fixes behavior and
prevents any form of forgiveness.
In the United States, nearly one-third of adult Americans have some form of
criminal record (Friedman 2015). Although having a criminal record has become
increasingly common with aggressive sentencing and new crime bills, the costs and
consequences faced by people with criminal records have also become more common.
However, in recognizing the barriers to reintegration (and the positive outcomes that can
be generated from encouraging ex-offenders to reintegrate into society) we must
acknowledge how internet records and an absence of digital privacy have dealt major
blows to forgiving ex-offenders.
Under federal laws, Congress has left the majority of record enforcement and the
punishment of criminals, as well as rules around record expungement, to the state.
Expungement—or the legal process of removing, sealing, or destroying an individual’s
criminal record—allows individuals to move beyond their actions of wrongdoing and
pursue more meaningful reintegration into society. Indeed, it can “soften the severity of
post-incarceration consequences” by removing public knowledge of one’s wrongdoing,
and it can aid in applying for jobs and finding housing (Silva 2011, 158). However, the
process of seeking expungements can be costly for individuals to pursue, and records
available for expungement vary by state, which highlights its mixed success. While the
usefulness of expungement policies varies by state, 45 out of 50 U.S. states offer some
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judicial or legislative process for removing information off of one’s record. Usually, an
individual must wait for a certain period of time after their sentence to show that they
have attempted to grow from their acts of wrongdoing. This period ranges in time, and
the crimes eligible for expungement range from only arrest records (non-conviction) to
single felonies, misdemeanors, or in the most restrictive states, relief only for groups
specifically “deserving of leniency,” such as juvenile offenders or people who are victims
of trafficking (Colgate Love 2022, 52-56). Likewise, in the most grave instances of
violence, such as murder, sexual offenses, or crimes against children, criminal record
expungement is impossible at the felony level, and only occasionally successful with
misdemeanor offenses.
Although expungement practices do offer some lessening of the harsh collateral
consequences faced by former offenders, they are also heavily criticized for failing to
situate rehabilitation in a community approach. Recognizing the community’s role in
encouraging prosocial behavior—rather than as an engine of perpetuating punishment
through stigma and social isolation—is one that the U.S. does not take kindly to. Rather,
expungement is considered a deeply flawed practice for providing rehabilitation options
to previous offenders, in that it fails to reckon with the broader societal conditions that so
deeply stigmatize having a criminal record (Colgate Love 2003, Lageson 2022). While it
is an imperfect tool for allowing individuals to move beyond their records, expungement
has provided amelioration of the harsh collateral consequences faced by many
individuals. Community stigma for people with records of incarceration not only reflects
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an additional barrier to their reintegration into society, but an immovable obstacle to
moving on in the era of the internet.
The case of Martin v. Hearst (2015) demonstrates how expungement statutes have
struggled to maintain usefulness in the digital age. Lorraine Martin and her two sons were
arrested on drug possession charges. Many news outlets owned by Hearst Publishing Co.
reported on this case, posting the articles online. The charges were eventually dropped by
the state, and Martin had her arrest record erased under the Connecticut Statute Record
Erasure, then sought to have the newspapers remove the information in kind. However,
when the newspaper refused, Martin sued the newspaper corporation for libelous
depiction of her under false light and negligent infliction of emotional distress. However,
the Second District Court of appeals decided in favor of the newspaper. In the case, the
criminal expungements were found to represent the “legal truth,” that in the eyes of the
state government, Martin had not been arrested; while the media organization could
likewise not be sued for false light claims, since Martin’s arrest was factually accurate
(Leta-Jones 2016, 65). This case highlights how, even after expungement, an individual
cannot escape the history of their criminal records due to its ready availability online.
Moving into the digital age, the ability for individuals to seek relief through the
expungement process reflects a fundamental flaw of expecting privacy and secrecy in a
process that has developed concurrently with rapid, easy dissemination of any and all
types of criminal records. Violations of privacy, and of the underlying tenets geared
towards forgiveness, include numerous sources that publish information relating to
individuals’ criminal and arrest records. These include “public and private databases,”
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from third-party mugshot websites that publish booking photos of individuals (regardless
of conviction or charging status) to newspaper articles which dredge up decades-old
convictions after individuals have attempted to move on (Lageson 2016, 138).
Expungement statutes, which intend to prevent (to some degree) the community from
knowing about individuals when they have made attempts to amend, do not protect the
at-will harvesting of information at a price.
Thus, criminal justice reforms in the United States have suffered implementation
issues at the hands of the internet. ‘Clean slate’ mechanisms fail to deliver real
forgetfulness to people seeking forgiveness of their crimes. That is, expungement does
not provide any opportunity for forgetfulness of one’s past actions, even though the
purported goal of expungement is one that allows forgiveness of one’s past. From thirdparty databases that amass and reproduce mugshots and criminal records, to news articles
on the internet that prevent an individual from receiving the benefits of erasure of
records, many clean slate initiatives aim to allow for reintegration of individuals with
histories of incarceration. However, without an active ability to remove associated stories
and information relating to arrests and convictions, criminal expungement pathways are
largely non- fungible in the technological age.
Section V: Policy Directions for the Digital Privacy in the United States
Throughout the history of the United States, privacy has been a muddled topic.
Legal theorists have tried to define privacy as a civil liability tort, where invasions of
privacy amount to damage to an individual’s inviolable personality rights. In these
attempts to chart a path for a right to privacy to be integrated into existing civil liberties,
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the common law system was thought to be a boon to precipitate personality rights within
the Constitution. However, the right to privacy has languished in the judicial branch, due
to the Supreme Court’s refusal to compromise any grounds of freedom of expression.
Instead, courts have bifurcated privacy into a right to be free from government intrusion
under the Fourth Amendment, and a rarer right to privacy in cases involving invasions of
privacy and a ‘reasonable person’ standard.
In contrast, legislative decisions have tended to support access to the free market
and competition online, rather than consumer privacy. Laws like Section 230 allow
internet service providers to avoid responsibility for information posted on their servers,
even for potentially libelous or privacy-invading information about others online (Gajda
2015, 125). Similarly, the statutory evolution of a right to privacy has been narrowly
focused, with Congress declaring privacy to be available only for sensitive information
(such as health records, education, children’s digital privacy, and information held by
federal agencies).
This lack of legislation in the U.S. also reflects a larger trend to “look more
readily” to markets in order to solve problems facing consumers (Leta-Jones 2016, 74);
that is, including corporations in proposed digital privacy solutions, and allowing market
pressures to dictate the options of privacy available to consumers. When consumers
‘demand’ privacy, the U.S.’s capitalist expectation is that some online provider will
likely ‘supply’ ways of integrating privacy into an individual’s online experience.
However, this use of the market to regulate what many, including EU lawmakers, believe
to be a fundamental human right of privacy, reflects a failure of the right in that it is only

92
available to the privileged “Americans with means” who can afford to use for-profit
websites that help to clean up people’s reputation online (Ibid. 74).
While serious obstacles still exist for comprehensive digital privacy regulations,
many are hopeful that the changing frontiers of privacy will, by necessity, be
reconsidered in light of the rapidly evolving internet. In this section, I will discuss some
of the policy directions that have been proposed for digital privacy for U.S. consumers,
some which align more neatly with the GDPR’s ‘right to be forgotten’ than others. I will
mostly focus on proposed initiatives around amending or repealing Section 230, engaging
in some degree of federal legislation of a right to privacy, the many state developments of
consumer digital protections, and lastly, the possibility for re-evaluation of the right to
privacy in the judicial branch.
Jeffrey Rosen argues that a requirement by Google to delist links about
individuals would transform Google from a neutral arbiter into a “censor-in-chief,” rather
than a “neutral” force (Rosen 2012). However, Rosen’s key presumption that Google and
other search engines were ever neutral speaks to the challenges of writing code and
algorithms. Yet, this assumption is wrong: “data are not neutral” (Kim 2017; p. 860).
Written by humans, the code Google uses already does remove or filter content that it
believes could be offensive to users or other violations of the community guidelines of
the website. The market forces already “enable nontransparent filtering” beyond the
overly broad standard that repealed the Communications Decency Act in the first place
(Lessig 2008, 257). Filtering and deciding what gets to go online demonstrates that
Google and other search engines already participate in the censorship and moderation of
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content; there is just no body of oversight, and the internet search providers entirely
escape liability for what they choose to remove or not.
Thus, efforts have been made in recent years to attempt some broad internet
reforms through legislation. Republicans in Congress, such as Lindsey Graham (R-SC)
and Josh Hawley (R-MO), have advocated for either large-scale reforms or complete
repeal to Section 230 in order to stop “politically-minded censorship” of search engines
and social media networks (Robertson 2019). Indeed, there has been a marked political
bent in discussions over the past election cycle about Section 230; many Democrats argue
that internet providers must accept more of a role in moderating content on their sites,
such as claims of fake news emerging on Facebook, while Republicans argue that internet
providers and social networks moderate excessively, engaging in political censorship of
Republicans, as with the removal of Donald Trump from most major social media sites
(Ibid.). Thus, with potential for bipartisan support, Section 230 could see some
amendments or a process of repealing and replacing the law with one that forces search
engines to be more responsible for the information they host online.
However, calls to repeal Section 230 are met with staunch opposition from the
tech community, and from legal scholars, some of whom object to the existing immunity
of tech companies under Section 230. Ziniti (2008) argues that the immunity ISPs have
under Section 230 is a necessary part of the “long tail of Web 2.0” (Ziniti 2008, p. 593).
In this environment, digital citizens are able to harness the growth of the internet with
open-source software, new and better code, and the internet is able to deliver on the
highly “generative” environment of the internet without the government infringing on the
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growing value of the internet (Zittrain 2008, 65). In this view, over time, with more data
and a sensitivity by tech corporations towards privacy rights, the internet and ISPs will
self-correct, ‘fixing the bugs’ of past versions of the Web.
Weighing the freedom of the current internet versus the ‘chilling effect’ of
potential digital regulations, I think there are merits to both arguments. A chilling effect
on the developments of the internet would not reflect well on the free-market capitalist
approach that the United States has historically taken to regulating big business and
growing industries. However, the binary that Section 230 established, between either full
liability or full immunity for ISPs, sets up an impossible choice that obfuscates real issues
of invasions of privacy faced by U.S. digital consumers. Although Section 230 has its
detriments, a repeal of Section 230 and the sudden presence of immunity for internet
content would likely result in a chilling effect on new development on the internet and
would probably be overturned by the Supreme Court (Ziniti 2008, 595 & 607). Thus, I
would argue for amending Section 230 to strike a medium ground. Short of full immunity
for technology companies, numerous additions to the law could further protect consumers
online and draw technology companies towards brainstorming and creating new manners
of ‘generative activity’ to occur on the internet. I imagine that something along the lines
of Frank Pasquale’s “right to respond,” where search engines link an asterisk to allow for
responses by individuals to unfavorable articles, could serve as a partial solution to allow
for people to at least reckon with information posted about them online (Pasquale 2015,
523). Similar algorithmic fixes have been proposed by Lawrence Lessig and Viktor
Mayer-Schönberger. Mayer-Schönberger has proposed metadata expiration dates for
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most links, which would prevent the casual peruser of the internet from inadvertently
stumbling on the embarrassing past mistakes of another person, while also not being a
total barrier to invested parties finding the information (Mayor-Scönberger 2009, 179).
Likewise, Lessig suggests that “architecture” and the ways in which companies develop
code can be regulated by fixed constraints that can apply evenly across the internet
(Lessig 2008, 345).
Thus, while Section 230 is far from perfect, a vacuum of guidance for internet
companies would not stand in the current court system. That being said, the risks to
individuals from invasions of privacy online are so great that the balance must not
automatically tip towards big technology companies.
In addition to current agitations around Section 230, there have also been
bipartisan proposals in Congress to use antitrust practices to regulate U.S. citizens’
privacy online. Senators Amy Klobuchar (D-MN) and Marsha Blackburn (R-TN) have
proposed an antitrust amendment to protect privacy, to weaken internet search providers’
monopolies over consumer data. The ability for Google and large technology companies
to amass large amounts of personal data demonstrates a different risk to privacy, that
individuals do not know what information different web browsers are collecting from
consumers. Given the 76 workdays per year that it would take for the average person to
read every privacy policy they encounter, the amount of information we blindly cede to
search providers reflects a lack of digital literacy by consumers unaware of the data
privacy costs of interacting online (Leta-Jones 2016, 86). Discussing the monopolistic
advantage that Google in particular has over other search engines, Pasquale describes it
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as “self-reinforcing; the better it is, the more searchers use it, and the more searchers use
it, the more data it has for improving itself” (Pasquale 2015, 527). Consumers are giving
data away in unknowable ways, and this data allows for the consolidation of a handful of
the largest internet corporations. However, with the General Data Protection Regulation
to combat corporate threats to consumer digital privacy in the EU, European proponents
argue that using antitrust law to protect privacy online is something that the GDPR and
the State Data Protection Authorities (DPAs) can already do much better and with
legitimate authority (Meyer 2019). However, given this potential workaround for digital
privacy in the United States, an antitrust law could help weaken Big Technology’s
chokehold and allow for the reinforcement of digital privacy into U.S. legislation.
In addition to these federal proposals for expanding digital privacy rights of U.S.
technology users, many states have begun to champion a state-level right to
privacy. With California, Colorado, and Virginia leading the charge, these states have
adopted legislation around consumer privacy protections. For example, California has
pushed the U.S. conception of privacy through the passage of many digital privacy laws,
with the first around the digital privacy of minors in 2013 under the Privacy Rights for
California Minors in the Digital World. This law allowed Californians under the age of
18 to remove information that they themselves had posted online. While republished
versions were not removed, this law did become one of the “few circumstances under
U.S. law that allows truthful information to be retracted from the public domain,” second
only to copyright laws (Leta-Jones 2016, 68). This heightened regulation of digital
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privacy for children also paved the way for further privacy developments for all
California consumers online.
Next, with the California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018 (CCPA) and California
Consumer Privacy Rights Act (CPRA) in 2018 and 2020, respectively. The CCPA allows
for individuals to opt-out of data collection practices, allows individuals to request the
information that any business holds on them, and perhaps most importantly, allows
consumers to request that the business delete the personal information (California Civil
Code, 1798.105 a). Under Proposition 24, the California Consumer Privacy Rights Act
(CPRA) established a further-reaching digital privacy protection for California digital
consumers, one that mirrors the language of the EU’s GDPR. Backing up the ‘right to
delete’ present in the CCPA, the CPRA maintains that an individual can request the right
to delete any information held by a business. Additionally, the CPRA established a
California Consumer Protection Agency to handle appeals and enforcement of the right to
delete statute. Combining statutory language of the rights of the California consumer,
which situates the right to digital privacy within fundamental rights of the person, allows
for increased enforceability of these state-level policy implementations.
Likewise, a 2021 statute granted the right to digital privacy to Colorado internet
users. Under the Colorado Consumer Protection Act, Coloradans have the right to
“access, correct, or delete personal data, and the right to opt-out of the sale of personal
data,” granting the Office of the Attorney General the right to enforce and impose
sanctions on “controllers” who violate this law (2021 S.B. 190, 6-1-1302). Lastly, in
Virginia, the 2021 Consumer Data Protection Act (CDPA) also applies to large data
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controllers (businesses which have access to the data of 100,000 consumers or more), and
it outlines the rights to privacy of the citizen to “access, correct, or delete” data, as well as
to empower the Attorney General and the Consumer Privacy Fund to enforce the law.
In all three of these states, the language around the right to digital privacy mirrors
the language of the GDPR, albeit using “consumer” instead of “data subject,” and
“delete” instead of “erase.” However, the implications around these laws are that the
states, tired of the slow developments of the right to digital privacy at the federal level,
have proposed digital privacy rights within their states. Likewise, similar digital privacy
bills have been proposed to the State legislatures in Utah, Iowa, Minnesota,
Massachusetts, New York, and a handful of other states (IAPP US State Privacy
Legislation Tracker).
The success of these policies has not been measured yet, but in theory, these state
provisions will certainly raise the costs of operating for internet service providers within
their state. In general, this may signal that the ‘will of the people’ is changing towards
wanting the government to step in to legislate privacy rights. Yet, in responding to
individual state’s rules about digital privacy, the rise in transactional costs shouldered
both by state regulators and by technology corporations could foreshadow the adoption of
a federal right to privacy.
While these many regulatory and statutory proposals for a right to digital privacy
in the United States appear promising, the issue of First Amendment rights still hangs
over the Constitutionality of these laws. In passing laws about the “deletion” of material
online, strong proponents of the First Amendment will likely be the first to raise the cry
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of censorship. However, given the changing conditions of the technological landscape,
the changing preferences of U.S. citizens towards some nuanced balancing of a right to
privacy, the Supreme Court may eventually be called upon again to hear the issue of
privacy online. With the ability to overturn long standing precedent, the Supreme Court
has reinterpreted the Constitution in deference to the changing mores and cultural norms
of society. From Olmstead to Katz, the Supreme Court changed its tune around what
constituted an invasion of privacy, considering changing public opinion and the ubiquity
of new technologies.
This approach of judicial activism, in light of information that the Founding
Fathers could never have imagined, does potentially hold promise in the long-term for
navigating the right to digital privacy for U.S. consumers. In looking at digital privacy
laws developed at the turn of the 21st Century, some scholars observed that
Congressional movement to legislate online was actually slowing down judicial
developments, and that “statutory changes cut short the natural adaptation of the law to
the internet” (Ziniti 2008, 596-597). Thus, some have faith that, although the common
law may take longer to come around, situating rights to privacy within Constitutional
parameters reflects a cementation of privacy rights as a fundamental value of the
American public, and one that deserves protection under the Constitution. Perhaps digital
privacy, and the right to be forgotten, will once again force the U.S. courts to reconsider
the Constitutional protections granted to the citizen.
Conclusion
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In this paper, I have aimed to provide an overview of the historical and legal conditions
that led to a right to be forgotten in the EU. In looking at France as a model country for
digital privacy, France’s existing traditions of upholding privacy as a “personality” right
have made the transition into virtual space a small jump of technological implementation
and holding search engines accountable for the information that they show to internet
users. The right to privacy as a reputational concern has allowed the French GDPR Law
to expand the principles within the EU-wide General Data Protection Regulation and
introduce a distinctly French approach to the right to be forgotten online.
In contrast, the unsteady legal ground of privacy in the United States has made a
right to privacy (thus far) all but impossible within the confines of the common law legal
system and in the shadow of the First Amendment. Indeed, a constitutional right to
privacy has been narrowly defined under the Fourth Amendment to mean freedom from
governmental intrusion, while other privacy rights—such as the right to be free of
invasions of privacy from fellow citizens or the media—have fallen to the wayside in
U.S. jurisprudence.
Still, growing concerns over the risks to individual privacy has led to a marked
increase in the statutory and regulatory arenas. In 1973, a report on the “Records,
Computers, and the Rights of Citizens” developed most of the standards around fair
information practices and principles (FIPPs) and data use practices, which have been
adopted and implemented globally, including the digital privacy rights outlined by the
General Data Protection Regulation in 2018.

101
Applying the lessons of data protection to criminal justice spheres, I expected to
find that countries with fewer privacy protections for ex-offenders would burden
individuals with the baggage of past wrongdoing. If that relationship was not so clear in
the distant past, I find that digitization has exposed this latent problem: there appears now
to be a large reciprocal relationship between rehabilitation as a criminal justice practice
and digital privacy as a mechanism to pursue reintegration.
These cases offer contrast to this broad portrait of privacy as a necessity of
criminal justice reform. In France, the goals of reintegration are second only to strong
rights to privacy for all, with privacy rights providing additional reintegration help to
former offenders. France’s criminal justice structures allow individuals to move past their
acts of transgression, and the government aims to encourage prosocial behavior in order
to help former offenders reintegrate into society and desist from crime. The opposite
pattern emerges in the United States. A slow, multivalent construction of privacy in both
civil and criminal cases has left little room for obscurity around an individual’s right to
conceal information about themselves. The United States has implicitly continued this
transparency into criminal justice spheres. With an immediately available database of
criminal records online, an individual’s ability to move beyond one’s past actions
becomes near-impossible with the perpetuity of online documentation, with First
Amendment claims bolstering online providers to be able to show any personal
information online.
This thesis attempts to reconcile understandings of forgiveness in the criminal
justice sense with practical mechanisms of forgetting online. The dyadic relationship
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between forgiveness and forgetfulness reflects how each process complements the other.
Forgiveness requires an honest appraisal of the harms done to society from one’s
transgressions, but it also provides a restorative justice approach to harms caused within
the community. Forgetting, meanwhile, holds the intentional obscurity of information as
a goal in itself; that we are all entitled to ‘clean slates’ to the actions of our past, whether
criminal or not. If complete information is entirely available to society, an individual
cannot move forward from their past and regain standing within their community. Stigma
and irrevocable online information both form intense social barriers to rehabilitation with
no path forward for ex-offenders. Conversely, forgetting without forgiving removes the
certification of an individual’s restoration, and does not honor the growth that must
necessarily be a part of the reintegration process. We must recognize the harms caused by
transgressing social norms and laws, while also acknowledging that community
forgiveness cannot be leveraged for perpetuity around one’s past.
The right to be forgotten challenges conventional wisdom around what it means to
remember, and challenges us as citizens interacting with the digital world, to ask
ourselves whether remembrance is a noble pursuit. The right to be forgotten relies on a
community pact, that I will not pry into your past if you extend me the same courtesy.
The right to digital privacy, then, must reframe privacy as a social good, or that which is
beneficial to me and my neighbor. It is this idea of “privacy as a social good” that reflects
the value in preserving spaces of autonomy and obscurity; removing widespread
community knowledge of our missteps means that we can reinvent and transform beyond
the worst parts of our past (Regan 2011; 498). Privacy, and the ability to exist without

103
unwanted social intrusions, is a foundational component of participation in society.
Under this frame of thought, privacy must be valued by the community, and strong
protections must be built into law and social norms in order for renewal to occur.
Thus, in order to actually reckon with the right to privacy in the United States, we
will likely have to question the assumption of First Amendment supremacy, and to place
privacy in a larger social context. However likely it is that Americans would enjoy the
right to be forgotten, this would require a radical shift in policy, social norms, and
algorithms from remembering to intentionally forgetting in order to allow citizens of the
internet to distance themselves from their pasts and reconcile with society. Short of
radical, cultural change, this relationship between forgiveness and forgetting reflects how
criminal justice reform almost demands a systematic approach to absolution of one’s
wrongdoings, and digital privacy concerns have forced us to reckon with our personal
data habits and information we post online. Perhaps the right to be forgotten will put
digital privacy into language that allows for inspection of how we legislate matters of
wrongdoing, and will allow policy to deliver on the social and legal promises of
forgiveness.

104
References
Abrams, Floyd. October 22, 2021. “The Supreme Court Faces a Huge Test on Libel Law.”
The New York Times.
Alschuler, Albert. (2003). “The changing purpose of criminal punishment: a retrospective
on the past century and some thoughts about the next.” Chicago Law Review. Vol. 6,
Winter.
Audit, Bernard. (1977). “Recent revisions of the French civil code.” La. L. Rev., 38, 747.
Auxier, Brooke. (January 27, 2020). “Most Americans support the right to have some
personal info removed from online searches.” Pew Research Center.
Barbas, Samantha. 2012. “The Sidis Case and the Origins of Modern Privacy Law.”
Columbia Journal of Law and the Arts. SUNY Buffalo Law and The Baldy Center for
Law and Social Policy.
Bennett, C. J. (2011). “In defense of privacy: the concept and the regime.” Surveillance &
Society. 8(4), 485-496.
Beverley-Smith, H., Ohly, A., & Lucas-Schloetter, A. (2005). “French law. In Privacy,
Property and Personality: Civil Law Perspectives on Commercial Appropriation.”
Cambridge Intellectual Property and Information Law, pp. 147-205.
Bode, Leticia and Meg Leta-Jones. 2018. “Do Americans Want a Right to be Forgotten?
Estimating Public Support for Digital Erasure Legislation.” Policy and Internet. DOI:
10.1002/poi3.174
Borgesius, Frederik Zuiderveen. 2018. “Privacy, Freedom of Expression, and the Right to
be Forgotten.” Cambridge Handbook of Consumer Privacy.
Brimblecombe, F., & Phillipson, G. (2018). Regaining Digital Privacy: The New Right to
Be Forgotten and Online Expression. Canadian Journal of Comparative and
Contemporary Law, 4, 1-66.
Brock, George. 2016. The Right to Be Forgotten: Privacy and Media in the Digital Age.
Bloomsbury Publishing.
Brunette, Robert. 1972. “Rehabilitation, Privacy and Freedom of the Press—Striking a
New Balance: Briscoe v. Reader's Digest Association.” 5 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 544.

105
Californians for Safety and Justice. 2018. “Repairing the Road to Redemption in
California.” Second Chance Project Annual Report. https://safeandjust.org/wpcontent/uploads/CSJ_SecondChances-ONLINE-May14.pdf
Cheh, Mary M. (1991). “Constitutional limits on using civil remedies to achieve criminal
law objectives: understanding and transcending the criminal-civil law distinction.”
Hastings Law Journal, 42(5), 1325-1414.
Chin, Gabriel. 2016. August 2012. “The New Civil Death: Rethinking Punishment in the
Era of Mass Conviction.” UC Davis Legal Studies Research Paper Series. Research
Paper 302.
Clean Slate Initiative. “Clean Slate Initiative Celebrates Passage of Michigan’s Automated
Criminal Record Expungement Legislation.” Website.
Commerce Department’s Internet Policy Task Force. 2010. “Consumer Data Privacy in a
Networked World: A Framework for Protecting Privacy and Promoting Innovation in
the Global Digital Economy.” White House, Obama Administration Report.
Council of Europe. 1981. “Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to
Automatic Processing of Personal Data.” Strasbourg 28/01/1981 - Treaty open for
signature by the member States and for accession by non-member States. ETS-Treaty
108.
Craven, J. B. (1976). Personhood: The Right to Be Let Alone. Duke Law Journal, 1976(4),
699–720.
DATA\, P. O. P. (1995). “Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the
Council on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data
and on the free movement of such data.” Official Journal L, 281(23/11), 0031-0050.
De Baets, Antoon. (2016). A historian's view on the right to be forgotten. International
Review of Law, Computers & Technology, 30:1-2, 57-66.
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, Secretary’s Advisory Committee on
Automated Personal Data Systems. June 25, 1973. “Records, Computers, and the
Rights of Citizens.” HEW Report.
Deringer, Kathryn. (2003) "Privacy and the Press: The Convergence of British and French
Law in Accordance with the European Convention of Human Rights." Penn State
International Law Review: Vol. 22: No. 1, Article 12.
Dowdell, John W. (2017). “An American Right to Be Forgotten.” Winter Vol. 52, Issue 2
Tulsa Law Review. 311.

106
Downes, David. (2001). The macho penal economy mass incarceration in the United States
from a European perspective. Punishment and Society, 3(1), 61-80.
Dror, Yehezkel. (1957). Values and the Law. The Antioch Review, 17(4), 440-454.
doi:10.2307/4610000
Faisal, Kamrul. (2021). “Balancing between Right to Be Forgotten and Right to Freedom
of Expression in Spent Criminal Convictions.” Security and Privacy, 4(4), 157.
Federal Communications Commission. April 20, 2016. “Protecting the Privacy of
Customers of Broadband and Other Telecommunications Services.” Federal Register,
Vol. 81, No. 76.
Floridi, Luciano. 2015. “The Right to be Forgotten': A Philosophical View.” SSRN.
Friedman, Matthew. November 15, 2015. “Just Facts: As Many Americans Have Criminal
Records as College Diplomas.” Brennan Center for Justice Fact Sheet.
Gajda, Amy. 2007. “What if Samuel D. Warren Hadn't Married a Senator's Daughter?
Uncovering the Press Coverage that Led to The Right to Privacy.” SSRN.
Gajda, Amy. (2015). The First Amendment Bubble. Harvard University Press.
Gibbs, Samuel. August 2014. “France requests most 'right to be forgotten' removals from
Google.” The Guardian.
Globocnik, Jure. (2020). “The Right to Be Forgotten is Taking Shape: CJEU Judgments in
GC and Others (C-136/17) and Google v CNIL (C-507/17).” GRUR International,
69(4), 380-388.
Graves, Franklin, & Gabriel, Germain. (2020). “Right to Not Be Forgotten (Sometimes):
Celebrity Privacy Rights in a Data-Driven World.” Landslide® Magazine, 13(2).
Gullapalli, Vaidya. November 6, 2019. “The U.S. Has No Right to be Forgotten. But One
News Outlet Has Been Weighing the Costs of the Internet’s Long Memory.” The
Appeal.
Haber, Eldar. 2018. “Digital Expungement.” Maryland Law Review. Volume 77, Issue 2,
Article 3.
Hauch, Jeanne M. (1994). “Protecting private facts in France: The Warren and Brandeis
tort is alive and well and flourishing in Paris.” Tulane Law Review, 68(5), 1219-1302.

107
Herzog-Evans, Martine. 2011. “Judicial rehabilitation in France: Helping with the desisting
process and acknowledging achieved desistance.” European Journal of Probation.
Vol. 3, No.1, 2011.
Kalven, Harry. (1966). Privacy in Tort Law: Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong? Law and
Contemporary Problems, 31(2), 326–341. https://doi.org/10.2307/1190675
Kantorowicz-Reznichenko, E. (2013). The ‘Net-Widening’ Problem and its Solutions: The
Road to a Cheaper Sanctioning System. Available at SSRN 2387493.
Kim, Pauline. T. (2017). “Data-Driven Discrimination at Work.” William & Mary Law
Review, 58(3), 857-936.
Kirk, David S. and Sarah Wakefield. 2018. “Collateral Consequences of Punishment: A
Critical Review and Path Forward.” Annual Review of Criminology. Pg 171-194.
Krotoszynski Jr, Ronald. J. (2013). “The Polysemy of Privacy.” Ind. LJ, 88, 881.
Lageson, Sarah. E. (2016). “Found out and opting out: The consequences of online criminal
records for families.” The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social
Science, 665(1), 127-141.
Lageson, Sarah. E. (2020). Digital punishment: Privacy, stigma, and the harms of datadriven criminal justice. Oxford University Press.
Lageson, Sarah. E. (2022). Criminal Record Stigma and Surveillance in the Digital Age.
Annual Review of Criminology, 5, 67-90.
Lessig, Lawrence. 2006. “Code: Version 2.0.” Basic Books, Perseus Group.
Leta-Jones, Meg. 2016. Control + Z: The Right to Be Forgotten. NYU Press.
Mantelero, Alessandro. 2013. “The EU Proposal for a General Data Protection Regulation
and the roots of the ‘right to be forgotten’.” Computer Law & Security Review Volume
29, Issue 3, June 2013, Pages 229–235.
Markesinis, B.S. Dec. 2009. “Foreign Law Translations.” University of Texas at Austin
School of Law, Foreign Law Translation, France.
https://law.utexas.edu/transnational/foreign-law-translations/french/case.php?id=1254
Maruna, Shadd. 2011. “Judicial Rehabilitation and the Clean Bill of Health in Criminal
Justice.” European Journal of Probation. 3(1). 91-117.

108
Mayer-Schönberger, Viktor. 2009. “Delete: The Virtue of Forgetting in the Digital Age.”
Princeton University Press.
McMahon, Maeve. W. (1992). The Persistent Prison?: Rethinking Decarceration and
Penal Reform. University of Toronto Press.
Meijer, Sonja, Harry Annison, and Ailbhe O’Loughlin. 2019. “Fundamental Rights and
Legal Consequences of Criminal Conviction.” Oñati International Series in Law and
Society. Hart Publishing.
Mendels, Pamela. June 26, 1997. “Supreme Court Throws Out Communications Decency
Act.” The New York Times.
Meyer, David. April 23, 2019. “The privacy and antitrust worlds are starting to cross over.”
International Association of Privacy Professionals (IIAP).
Mitsilegas, Valsamis. 2015. “The Symbiotic Relationship Between Mutual Trust and
Fundamental Rights in Europe’s Area of Criminal Justice.” The New Journal of
European Criminal Law. Volume 6, Issue 4.
Moor, James H. (1998). “If Aristotle were a computing professional.” Computers and
Society, 28(3), 13-16.
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, OECD. 1980. “OECD
Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data.”
Palmer, Chassen. 2020. “Celebrity Privacy: How France Solves Privacy Problems
Celebrities Face in the United States.” California Western International Law Journal,
50(1), 9.
Palmer, Vernon Valentine. (2011). “Three Milestones in the History of Privacy in the
United States.” Tul. Eur. & Civ. LF, 26, 67.
Pasquale, Frank. 2016. “Reforming the Law of Reputation.” University of Maryland
Francis King Carey School of Law, Legal Studies Research. No. 2016-3.
Prosser, William. (1960) Privacy. California Law Review, 48, 383-423.
Radamaker, Dallis. 1988. The Political Role of Courts in Modern Democracies: Chapter 7,
Legal Culture in France. Macmillan Press, London.
Regan, Priscilla M. 2011. “Response to Bennett: Also, in defence of privacy.” Surveillance
& Society 8(4): 497-499. http://www.surveillance-and-society.org | ISSN: 1477-7487

109
Reichel, P. L., & Reichel, P. L. (1999). Comparative criminal justice systems: A topical
approach. Upper Saddle River, New Jersey: Prentice Hall.
Reymond, Michel José. 2019. “The future of the European Union ‘Right to be Forgotten.’”
Latin American Law Review n.o 02, pg. 81-98.
Robertson, Adi. June 19, 2019. “Why the Internet’s Most Important Law Exists and How
People are Still Getting it Wrong.” The Verge.
Rosen, Jeffrey. July/August 2012. “The Right to Be Forgotten.” The Atlantic.
Rustad, M. L., & Kulevska, S. (2014). Reconceptualizing the right to be forgotten to enable
transatlantic data flow. Harv. JL & Tech., 28, 349.
Satariano. Adam. (Sept 4, 2019). “‘Right to Be Forgotten’ Privacy Rule Is Limited by
Europe’s Top Court.” The New York Times.
Scott, Mark. June 12, 2015. “France Wants Google to Apply ‘Right to Be Forgotten’
Ruling Worldwide or Face Penalties.” The New York Times.
Silva, Lahny R. 2010. “Clean Slate: Expanding Expungements and Pardons for NonViolent Federal Offenders. University of Cincinnati Law Review. Issue 155.
Solove, Daniel J. (2000). “Privacy and power: Computer databases and metaphors for
information privacy.” Stan. L. Rev., 53, 1393.
Solove, Daniel J. (2004). The digital person: Technology and privacy in the information
age. (Vol. 1). NYU Press.
Solove, Daniel J. and Hartzog, Woodrow. 2013. “The FTC and the New Common Law of
Privacy.” Columbia Law Review 115, 583.
Stepanyuk, Mark. Feb 18, 2022. “Stratton Oakmont v. Prodigy Services: The Case that
Spawned Section 230.” Washington Journal of Law, Technology, and Arts.
Stone, Harlan. F. (1936). The Common Law in the United States. Harvard Law Review,
50(1), 4-26.
“The Concept of the Right to be Forgotten and the Analysis of the Results of Decision No.
ECJ-131/12 Rendered by the European Court of Justice.” November 12, 2019.
Mondaq.
Toobin, Jeffrey. September 29, 2014. “The Solace of Oblivion.” The New Yorker.

110
Vallas, Rebecca and Sharon Dietrich. 2014. “One Strike and You’re Out: How We Can
Eliminate Barriers to Economic Security and Mobility for People with Criminal
Records.” Washington: Center for American Progress.
Villaronga, Eduard. F., Kieseberg, P., & Li, T. (2018). “Humans forget, machines
remember: Artificial intelligence and the right to be forgotten.” Computer Law &
Security Review, 34(2), 304-313.
Warren, Samuel; Louis D. Brandeis. Dec. 15, 1890. “The Right to Privacy.” Harvard Law
Review, Vol. 4, No. 5., pp. 193-220.
Waltman, Jerold L, and Kenneth M. Holland. 1988. The Political Role of the Law Courts in
Modern Democracies. Macmillan Press, London.
Werro, Franz. 2009. “The Right to Inform v. the Right to be Forgotten- A Transatlantic
Clash”
Georgetown Law, Center for Transnational Legal Studies Colloquium. Research Paper No.
2.
Westin, Alan F. (1968). “Privacy and freedom.” Washington and Lee Law Review, 25(1),
166.
Whitman, James Q. (2003). "The two western cultures of privacy: Dignity versus liberty."
Yale Law Journal. 113: 1151.
Xue, M., Magno, G., Landulfo Teixeira P Cunha, E., Almeida, V., & Ross, K. W. (2016).
The right to be forgotten in the media: A data-driven study. Proceedings on Privacy
Enhancing Technologies, 2016(4), 389-402.
Zimmerman, Diane L. 1982. “Requiem for a heavyweight: A farewell to Warren and
Brandeis's privacy tort.” Cornell L. Rev., 68, p.291.
Ziniti, Cecilia. (2008). “Optimal liability system for online service providers: how zeran v.
America online got it right and web 2.0 proves it.” Berkeley Technology Law Journal,
23(1), 583-616.
Zittrain, Jonathan. (2008). “Privacy 2.0.” U. Chi. Legal F., 65.
Cases Cited
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438(1928)
Melvin v. Reid (1931)

111
Sidis v. FR Pub. Corporation (1938)
New York Times v. Sullivan (1964)
Griswold v. Connecticut (1965)
Katz v. United States (1967)
Briscoe v. Reader’s Digest Publishing Co. (1971)
Sipple v. Chronicle Publishing Co. (1984)
Roe v. Wade (1973)
Florida Star v. B.J.F. (1989)
Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe Inc (1991, NY District Court)
Stratton Oakmont v. Prodigy (1995, NY District Court)
Zeran v. America Online (AOL) (1997, Virginia District Court)
Martin v. Hearst (2015)

